Epistole (XIII, 1-90)

(1) Magnifico atque victorioso domino domino Cani Grandi de la Scala sacratissimi Cesarei Principatus in urbe Verona et civitate Vicentie Vicario Generali, devotissimus suus Dantes Alagherii florentinus natione non moribus, vitam orat per tempora diuturna felicem et gloriosi nominis perpetuum incrementum. (1) To the munificent and most victoroius Lord, the Lord Can Grande della Scala, Victor-General of the most holy principality of Caesar in the city of Verona, and town of Vicenza, his most devoted servant, Dante Alighieri, a Florentine by birth, not by disposition, prayeth long and happy life, and perpetual increase of the glory of his name.
(2) [1]. Inclita vestre Magnificentie laus, quam fama vigil volitando disseminat, sic distrahit in diversa diversos, ut hos in spem sue prosperitatis attollat, hos exterminii deiciat in terrorem. Huius quidem preconium, facta modernorum exsuperans, tanquam veri existentia latius arbitrabar aliquando superfluum. (2) The illustrious renown of your Magnificence, which wakeful Fame spreads abroad as she flies, affects divers persons in divers ways, so that some it uplifts with the hope of good fortune, while others it casts down with the dread of destruction. The report whereof, overtopping all deeds of recent times, I erstwhile did deem extravagant, as going beyond the appearence of truth.
(3) Verum ne diuturna me nimis incertitudo suspenderet, velut Austri regina Ierusalem petiit, velut Pallas petiit Elicona, Veronam petii fidis oculis discursurus audita, ibique magnalia vestra vidi, vidi beneficia simul et tetigi; et quemadmodum prius dictorum ex parte suspicabar excessum, sic posterius ipsa facta excessiva cognovi. Quo factum ut ex auditu solo cum quadam animi subiectione benivolus prius exstiterim, sed ex visu postmodum devotissimus et amicus. (3) But that continued uncertainty might not keep me longer in suspense, even as the Queen of the South sought Jerusalem, and as Pallas sought Helicon, so did I seek Verona, in order to examine with my own trusty eyes the things of which I had heard. And there was I witness of your splendour, there was I witness and partaker of your bounty; and whereas I had formerly suspected the reports to be somewhat unmeasured, I afterwards recognized that it was the facts themselves that were beyond measure. Whence it came to pass that whereas through hearsay alone, with a certain subjection of mind, I had previously become well disposed towards you, at the first sight of you I became your most devoted servant and friend.
(4) [2]. Nec reor amici nomen assumens, ut nonnulli forsitan obiectarent, reatum presumptionis incurrere, cum non minus dispares connectantur quam pares amicitie sacramento. Nam si delectabiles et utiles amicitias inspicere libeat, illis persepius inspicienti patebit preheminentes inferioribus coniugari personas. (4) Nor do I think that in assuming the name of friend I shall lay myself open to a charge of presumption, as some perchance might object; inasmuch as unequals no less than equals are united by the sacred tie of friendship. For if one should examine friendships which have been pleasant and profitable, it will be evident that in many cases the bond has been between persons of superior station and their inferiors.
(5) Et si ad veram ac per se amicitiam torqueatur intuitus, nonne summorum illustriumque principum plerunque viros fortuna obscuros, honestate preclaros, amicos fuisse constabit? Quidni, cum etiam Dei et hominis amicitia nequaquam impediatur excessu? (5) And if our attention be directed to true friendship for its own sake, shall we not find that the friends of illustrious and mighty princes have many a time been men obscure in condition but of distinguished virtue? Why not? since even the friendship of God and man is in no wise impeded by the disparity between them.
(6) Quod si cuiquam quod asseritur nunc videretur indignum, Spiritum Sanctum audiat, amicitie sue participes quosdam homines profitentem; nam in Sapientia de sapientia legitur «quoniam infinitus thesaurus est hominibus, quo qui usi sunt, participes facti sunt amicitie Dei». (6) But if any man consider this assertion unseemly, let him hearken to the Holy Spirit when it declares that certain men have been partakers of its friendship. For in Wisdom we read, concerning wisdom: 'For she is a treasure unto men that never faileth; which they that use are partakers of the friendship of God'.
(7) Sed habet imperitia vulgi sine discretione iudicium; et quemadmodum solem pedalis magnitudinis arbitratur, sic et circa mores vana credulitate decipitur. Nos autem quibus optimum quod est in nobis noscere datum est, gregum vestigia sectari non decet, quin ymo suis erroribus obviare tenemur. Nam intellectu ac ratione degentes, divina quadam libertate dotati, nullis consuetudinibus astringuntur; nec mirum, cum non ipsi legibus, sed ipsis leges potius dirigantur. (7) But the common herd in their ignorance judge without discernment; and even as they imagine the sun to be a foot across, so they judge with regard to questions of conduct; and they are deceived by their foolish credulity with regard to both the one and the other matter. But it does not become us, to whom it has been given to know what is best in our nature, to follow in the footsteps of the common herd; nay, rather are we bound to oppose their errors. For those who have vigour of intellect and reason, being endowed with a certain divine liberty, are not restricted by precedent. Nor is this to be wondered at, for it is not they who receive direction from the laws, but rather the laws them.
(8) Liquet igitur quod superius dixi, me scilicet esse devotissimum et amicum, nullatenus esse presumptum. (8) It is manifest, therefore, that what I said above, namely that I was your most devoted servant and friend, in no wise savours of presumption.
(9) [3]. Preferens ergo amicitiam vestram quasi thesaurum carissimum, providentia diligenti et accurata solicitudine illam servare desidero. (9) Esteeming, then, your friendship as a most precious treasure, I desire to preserve it with assiduous forethought and anxious care.
(10) Itaque, cum in dogmatibus moralis negotii amicitiam adequari et salvari analogo doceatur, ad retribuendum pro collatis beneficiis plus quam semel analogiam sequi mihi votivum est; et propter hoc munuscula mea sepe multum conspexi et ab invicem segregavi nec non segregata percensui, digniusque gratiusque vobis inquirens. (10) Therefore, since it is a doctrine of ethics that friendship is equalized and preserved by reciprocity, it is my wish to preserve due reciprocity in making a return for the bounty more than once conferred upon me. For which reason I have often and long examined such poor gifts as I can offer, and have set them out separately, and scrutinized each in turn, in order to decide which would be the most worthy and the most acceptable to you.
(11) Neque ipsi preheminentie vestre congruum comperi magis quam Comedie sublimem canticam que decoratur titulo Paradisi; et illam sub presenti epistola, tanquam sub epigrammate proprio dedicatam, vobis ascribo, vobis offero, vobis denique recommendo. (11) And I have found nothing more suitable even for your exalted station than the sublime cantica of the Comedy which is adorned with the title of Paradise; this, then, dedicated to yourself, with the present letter to serve as its superscription, I inscribe, offer, and in fine commend to you.
(12) [4]. Illud quoque preterire silentio simpliciter inardescens non sinit affectus, quod in hac donatione plus dono quam domino honoris et fame conferri videri potest; quin ymo, cum eius titulo iam presagium de gloria vestri nominis amplianda satis attentis videbar expressisse; quod de proposito. (12) Nor does the simple ardour of my affection permit me to pass over in silence the consideration that in this offering there may seem to be greater honour and fame conferred on the patron than on the gift; the rather that in the address I shall appear to such as read with attention to have given utterance to a forecast as to the increase of the glory of your name -- and this of set purpose.
(13) Sed zelus gratie vestre, quam sitio vitam parvipendens, a primordio metam prefixam urgebit ulterius. Itaque, formula consumata epistole, ad introductionem oblati operis aliquid sub lectoris officio compendiose aggrediar. (13) But eagerness for your favour, for which I thirst, heedless of envy, will urge me forward to the goal which was my aim from the first. And so, having made an end of what I had to say in epistolary form, I will now in the capacity of commentator essay a few words by way of introduction to the work which is offered for your acceptance. 
(14) [5]. Sicut dicit Phylosophus in secundo Metaphysicorum: «sicut res se habet ad esse, sic se habet ad veritatem»; cuius ratio est, quia veritas de re, que in veritate consistit tanquam in subiecto, est similitudo perfecta rei sicut est. (14) As the Philosopher says in the second book of the Metaphysics, 'as a thing is in respect of being, so is it in respect of truth'; the reason of which is, that the truth concerning a thing, which consists in the truth as in its subject, is the perfect likeness of the thing as it is.
(15) Eorum vero que sunt, quedam sic sunt ut habeant esse absolutum in se; quedam sunt ita ut habeant esse dependens ab alio per relationem quandam, ut eodem tempore esse et ad aliud se habere ut relativa; sicut pater et filius, dominus et servus, duplum et dimidium, totum et pars, et huiusmodi, in quantum talia. (15) Now of things which exist, some are such as to have absolute being in themselves; while others are such as to have their being dependent upon something else, by virtue of a certain relation, as being in existence at the same time, or having respect to some other thing, as in the case of correlatives, such as father and son, master and servant, double and half, the whole and part, and other similar things, in so far as they are related.
(16) Propterea quod esse talium dependet ab alio, consequens est quod eorum veritas ab alio dependeat; ignorato enim dimidio, nunquam cognoscitur duplum, et sic de aliis. (16) Inasmuch, then, as the being of such things depends upon something else, it follows that the truth of these things likewise depends upon something else; for if the half is unknown, its double cannot be known; and so of the rest.
(17) [6]. Volentes igitur aliqualem introductionem tradere de parte operis alicuius, oportet aliquam notitiam tradere de toto cuius est pars. Quapropter et ego, volens de parte supra nominata totius Comedie aliquid tradere per modum introductionis, aliquid de toto opere premittendum existimavi, ut facilior et perfectior sit ad partem introitus. (17) If any one, therefore, is desirous of offering any sort of introduction to part of a work, it behooves him to furnish some notion of the whole of which it is a part. Wherefore I, too, being desirous of offering something by way of introduction to the above-mentioned part of the whole Comedy, thought it incumbent on me in the first place to say something concerning the work as a whole, in order that access to the part might be the easier and the more perfect.
(18) Sex igitur sunt que in principio cuiusque doctrinalis operis inquirenda sunt, videlicet subiectum, agens, forma, finis, libri titulus, et genus phylosophie. De istis tria sunt in quibus pars ista quam vobis destinare proposui variatur a toto, scilicet subiectum, forma et titulus; in aliis vero non variatur, sicut apparet inspicienti; et ideo circa considerationem de toto ista tria inquirenda seorsum sunt: quo facto, satis patebit ad introductionem partis. (18) There are six points, then, as to which inquiry must be made at the beginning of every didactic work; namely, the subject, the author, the form, the aim, the title of the book, and the branch of philosophy to which it belongs. Now of these six points there are three in respect of which the part which I have had in mind to address to you differs from the whole work; namely, the subject, the form, and the title; whereas in respect of the others there is no difference, as is obvious to any one who considers the matter. Consequently, in an examination of the whole, these three points must be made the subject of a separate inquiry; which being done, the way will be sufficiently clear for the introduction to the part.
(19) Deinde inquiremus alia tria non solum per respectum ad totum, sed etiam per respectum ad ipsam partem oblatam. (19) Later we will examine the other three points, not only with reference to the whole work, but also with reference to the particular part which is offered to you.
(20) [7]. Ad evidentiam itaque dicendorum sciendum est quod istius operis non est simplex sensus, ymo dici potest polysemos, hoc est plurium sensuum; nam primus sensus est qui habetur per litteram, alius est qui habetur per significata per litteram. Et primus dicitur litteralis, secundus vero allegoricus, sive moralis, sive anagogicus. (20) For the elucidation, therefore, of what we have to say, it must be understood that the meaning of this work is not of one kind only; rather the work may be described as 'polysemous', that is, having several meanings; for the first meaning is that which is conveyed by the letter, and the next is that which is conveyed by what the letter signifies; the former of which is called literal, while the latter is called allegorical, or mystical [or moral, or anagogical].
(21) Qui modus tractandi, ut melius pateat, potest considerari in hiis versibus: «In exitu Israel de Egipto, domus Iacob de populo barbaro, facta est Iudea sanctificatio eius, Israel potestas eius». Nam si ad litteram solam inspiciamus, significatur nobis exitus filiorum Israel de Egipto, tempore Moysis; si ad allegoriam, nobis significatur nostra redemptio facta per Christum; si ad moralem sensum, significatur nobis conversio anime de luctu et miseria peccati ad statum gratie; si ad anagogicum, significatur exitus anime sancte ab huius corruptionis servitute ad eterne glorie libertatem. (21) And for the better illustration of this method of exposition we may apply it to the following verses: 'When Israel went out of Egypt, the house of Jacob from a people of strange language; Judah was his sanctuary, and Israel his dominion'. For if we consider the letter alone, the thing signified to us is the going out of the children of Israel from Egypt in the time of Moses; if the allegory, our redemption through Christ is signified; if the moral sense, the conversion of the soul from the sorrow and misery of sin to a state of grace is signified ; if the anagogical, the passing of the sanctified soul from the bondage of the corruption of this world to the liberty of everlasting glory is signified.
(22) Et quanquam isti sensus mystici variis appellentur nominibus, generaliter omnes dici possunt allegorici, cum sint a litterali sive historiali diversi. Nam allegoria dicitur ab 'alleon' grece, quod in latinum dicitur 'alienum', sive 'diversum'. (22) And although these mystical meanings are called by various names, they may one and all in a general sense be termed allegorical, inasmuch as they are different (diversi) from the literal or historical; for the word 'allegory' is so called from the Greek alleon, which in Latin is alienum (strange) or diversum (different).
(23) [8]. Hiis visis, manifestum est quod duplex oportet esse subiectum, circa quod currant alterni sensus. Et ideo videndum est de subiecto huius operis, prout ad litteram accipitur; deinde de subiecto, prout allegorice sententiatur. (23) This being understood, it is clear that the subject, with regard to which the alternative meanings are brought into play, must be twofold. And therefore the subject of this work must be considered in the first place from the point of view of the literal meaning, and next from that of the allegorical interpretation.
(24) Est ergo subiectum totius operis, litteraliter tantum accepti, status animarum post mortem simpliciter sumptus; nam de illo et circa illum totius operis versatur processus. (24) The subject, then, of the whole work, taken in the literal sense only, is the state of souls after death, pure and simple. For on and about that the argument of the whole work turns.
(25) Si vero accipiatur opus allegorice, subiectum est homo prout merendo et demerendo per arbitrii libertatem iustitie premiandi et puniendi obnoxius est. (25) If, however, the work be regarded from the allegorical point of view, the subject is man according as by his merits or demerits in the exercise of his free will he is deserving of reward or punishment by justice.
(26) [9]. Forma vero est duplex: forma tractatus et forma tractandi. Forma tractatus est triplex, secundum triplicem divisionem. Prima divisio est, qua totum opus dividitur in tres canticas. Secunda, qua quelibet cantica dividitur in cantus. Tertia, qua quilibet cantus dividitur in rithimos. (26) And the form is twofold -- the form of the treatise, and the form of the treatment. The form of the treatise is threefold, according to the threefold division. The first division is that whereby the whole work is divided into three cantiche; the second, whereby each cantica is divided into cantos; and the third, whereby each canto is divided into rhymed lines.
(27) Forma sive modus tractandi est poeticus, fictivus, descriptivus, digressivus, transumptivus, et cum hoc diffinitivus, divisivus, probativus, improbativus, et exemplorum positivus. (27) The form or manner of treatment is poetic, fictive, descriptive, digressive, and figurative; and further, it is definitive, analytical, probative, refutative, and exemplificative.
(28) [10]. Libri titulus est: 'Incipit Comedia Dantis Alagherii, florentini natione, non moribus'. Ad cuius notitiam sciendum est quod comedia dicitur a 'comos' villa et 'oda' quod est cantus, unde comedia quasi 'villanus cantus'. (28) The title of the book is 'Here begins the Comedy of Dante Alighieri, a Florentine by birth, not by disposition'. For the understanding of which it must be noted that 'comedy' is so called from comos, a village, and oda, a song; whence comedy is as it were a 'rustic song'.
(29) Et est comedia genus quoddam poetice narrationis ab omnibus aliis differens. Differt ergo a tragedia in materia per hoc, quod tragedia in principio est admirabilis et quieta, in fine seu exitu est fetida et horribilis; et dicitur propter hoc a 'tragos' quod est hircus et 'oda' quasi 'cantus hircinus', idest fetidus ad modum hirci; ut patet per Senecam in suis tragediis. Comedia vero inchoat asperitatem alicuius rei, sed eius materia prospere terminatur, ut patet per Terentium in suis comediis. Et hinc consueverunt dictatores quidam in suis salutationibus dicere loco salutis, 'tragicum principium et comicum finem'. (29) Now comedy is a certain kind of poetical narration which differs from all others. It differs, then, from tragedy in its subject-matter, in that tragedy at the beginning is admirable and placid, but at the end or issue is foul and horrible. And tragedy is so called from tragos, a goat, and oda ; as it were a 'goat-song', that is to say foul like a goat, as appears from the tragedies of Seneca. Whereas comedy begins with sundry adverse conditions, but ends happily, as appears from the comedies of Terence. And for this reason it is the custom of some writers in their salutation to say by way of greeting: 'a tragic beginning and a comic ending to you!'
(30) Similiter differunt in modo loquendi: elate et sublime tragedia; comedia vero remisse et humiliter, sicut vult Oratius in sua Poetria, ubi licentiat aliquando comicos ut tragedos loqui, et sic e converso:
Interdum tamen et vocem comedia tollit, iratusque Chremes tumido delitigat ore; et tragicus plerunque dolet sermone pedestri Telephus et Peleus, etc.
(30) Tragedy and comedy differ likewise in their style of language; for that of tragedy is high-flown and sublime, while that of comedy is unstudied and lowly. And this is implied by Horace in the Art of Poetry, where he grants that the comedian may on occasion use the language of tragedy, and vice versa: 'Yet sometimes comedy her voice will raise, And angry Chremes scold with swelling phrase; And prosy periods oft our ears assail When Telephus and Peleus tell their tragic tale'.
(31) Et per hoc patet quod Comedia dicitur presens opus. Nam si ad materiam respiciamus, a principio horribilis et fetida est, quia Infernus, in fine prospera, desiderabilis et grata, quia Paradisus; ad modum loquendi, remissus est modus et humilis, quia locutio vulgaris in qua et muliercule comunicant. (31) And from this it is clear that the present work is to be described as a comedy. For if we consider the subject-matter, at the beginning it is horrible and foul, as being Hell; but at the close it is happy, desirable, and pleasing, as being Paradise. As regards the style of language, the style is unstudied and lowly, as being in the vulgar tongue, in which even women-folk hold their talk. And hence it, is evident why the work is called a comedy.
(32) Sunt et alia genera narrationum poeticarum, scilicet carmen bucolicum, elegia, satira, et sententia votiva, ut etiam per Oratium patere potest in sua Poetria; sed de istis ad presens nihil dicendum est. (32) And there are other kinds of poetical narration, such as the pastoral poem, the elegy, the satire, and the votive song, as may also be gathered from Horace in the Art of Poetry; but of these we need say nothing at present.
(33) [11]. Potest amodo patere quomodo assignandum sit subiectum partis oblate. Nam si totius operis litteraliter sumpti sic est subiectum, status animarum post mortem, non contractus sed simpliciter acceptus, manifestum est quod hac in parte talis status est subiectum, sed contractus, scilicet status animarum beatarum post mortem. (33) It can now be shown in what manner the subject of the part offered to you is to be determined. For if the subject of the whole work taken in the literal sense is the state of souls after death, pure and simple, without limitation; it is evident that in this part the same state is the subject, but with a limitation, namely the state of blessed souls after death.
(34) Et si totius operis allegorice sumpti subiectum est homo prout merendo et demerendo per arbitrii libertatem est iustitie premiandi et puniendi obnoxius, manifestum est in hac parte hoc subiectum contrahi, et est homo prout merendo obnoxius est iustitie premiandi. (34) And if the subject of the whole work from the allegorical point of view is man according as by his merits or demerits in the exercise of his free will he is deserving of reward or punishment by justice, it is evident that in this part this subject has a limitation, and that it is man according as by his merits he is deserving of reward by justice.
(35) [12]. Et sic patet de forma partis per formam assignatam totius; nam si forma tractatus in toto est triplex, in hac parte tantum est duplex, scilicet divisio cantuum et rithimorum. (35) In like manner the form of the part is determined by that of the whole work. For if the form of the treatise as a whole is threefold, in this part it is twofold only, the division being that of the cantica and of the cantos.
(36) Non eius potest esse propria forma divisio prima, cum ista pars sit prime divisionis. (36) The first division (into cantiche) cannot be applicable to the form of the part, since the cantica is itself a part under the first division.
(37) [13]. Patet etiam de libri titulo; nam si titulus totius libri est 'Incipit Comedia etc.', ut supra; titulus autem huius partis est 'Incipit cantica tertia Comedie Dantis etc., que dicitur Paradisus'. (37) The title of the book also is clear. For the title of the whole book is 'Here begins the Comedy', &c., as above; but the title of the part is 'Here begins the third cantica of the Comedy of Dante, which is called Paradise'.
(38) [14]. Inquisitis his tribus in quibus variatur pars a toto, videndum est de aliis tribus in quibus nulla variatio est a toto. Agens igitur totius et partis est ille qui dictus est, et totaliter videtur esse. (38) These three points, in which the part differs from the whole, having been examined, we may now turn our attention to the other three, in respect of which there is no difference between the part and the whole. The author, then, of the whole and of the part is the person mentioned above, who is seen to be such throughout.
(39) [15]. Finis totius et partis esse posset et multiplex, scilicet propinquus et remotus; sed, omissa subtili investigatione, dicendum est breviter quod finis totius et partis est removere viventes in hac vita de statu miserie et perducere ad statum felicitatis. (39) The aim of the whole and of the part might [be] manifold; as, for instance, immediate and remote. But leaving aside any minute examination of this question, it may be stated briefly that the aim of the whole and of the part is to remove those living in this life from a state of misery, and to bring them to a state of happiness.
(40) [16]. Genus vero phylosophie sub quo hic in toto et parte proceditur, est morale negotium, sive ethica; quia non ad speculandum, sed ad opus inventum est totum et pars. (40) The branch of philosophy to which the work is subject, in the whole as in the part, is that of morals or ethics; inasmuch as the whole as well as the part was conceived, not for speculation, but with a practical object.
(41) Nam si in aliquo loco vel passu pertractatur ad modum speculativi negotii, hoc non est gratia speculativi negotii, sed gratia operis; quia, ut ait Phylosophus in secundo Methaphysicorum, «ad aliquid et nunc speculantur practici aliquando». (41) For if in certain parts or passages the treatment is after the manner of speculative philosophy, that is not for the sake of speculation, but for a practical purpose; since, as the Philosopher says in the second book of the Metaphysics: 'practical men occasionally speculate on things in their particular and temporal relations'.
(42) [17]. Hiis itaque premissis, ad expositionem littere secundum quandam prelibationem accedendum est, et illud prenuntiandum quod expositio littere nichil aliud est quam forme operis manifestatio. (42) Having therefore premised these matters, we may now apply ourselves to the exposition of the literal meaning, by way of sample; as to which it must first be understood that the exposition of the letter is in effect but a demonstration of the form of the work.
(43) Dividitur ergo ista pars, seu tertia cantica que Paradisus dicitur, principaliter in duas partes, scilicet in prologum et partem executivam. Pars secunda incipit ibi: 'Surgit mortalibus per diversas fauces'. (43) The part in question then, that is, this third cantica which is called Paradise, falls by its main division into two parts, namely the prologue, and the executive part; which second part begins: 'Surge ai mortali per diverse foci'.
(44) [18]. De parte prima sciendum est quod, quamvis comuni ratione dici posset exordium, proprie autem loquendo non debet dici nisi prologus; quod Phylosophus in tertio Rhetoricorum videtur innuere, ubi dicit quod «proemium est principium in oratione rethorica sicut prologus in poetica, et preludium in fistulatione». (44) As regards the first part, it should be noted that although in common parlance it might be termed an exordium, yet, properly speaking, it can only be termed a prologue; as the Philosopher seems to indicate in the third book of his Rhetoric, where he says that 'the proem in a rhetorical oration answers to the prologue in poetry, and to the prelude in flute-playing'.
(45) Est etiam prenotandum quod prenuntiatio ista, que comuniter exordium dici potest, aliter fit a poetis, aliter fit a rethoribus. (45) It must further be observed that this preamble, which may ordinarily be termed an exordium, is one thing in the hands of a poet, and another in those of an orator.
(46) Rethores enim concessere prelibare dicenda ut animum comparent auditoris; sed poete non solum hoc faciunt, quin ymo post hec invocationem quandam emittunt. (46) For orators are wont to give a forecast of what they are about to say, in order to gain the attention of their hearers. Now poets not be only do this, but in addition they make use of some sort of invocation afterwards.
(47) Et hoc est eis conveniens, quia multa invocatione opus est eis, cum aliquid contra comunem modum hominum a superioribus substantiis petendum est, quasi divinum quoddam munus. (47) And this is fitting in their case, for they have need of invocation in a large measure, inasmuch as they have to petition the superior beings for something beyond the ordinary range of human powers, something almost in the nature of a divine gift.
(48) Ergo presens prologus dividitur in partes duas, quia in prima premittitur quid dicendum sit, in secunda invocatur Apollo; et incipit secunda pars ibi: 'O bone Apollo, ad ultimum laborem'. (48) Therefore the present prologue is divided into two parts: in the first is given a forecast of what is to follow; in the second is an invocation to Apollo; which second part begins: 'O buono Apollo, all'ultimo lavoro', &c.
(49) [19]. Propter primam partem notandum quod ad bene exordiendum tria requiruntur, ut dicit Tullius in Nova Rethorica, scilicet ut benevolum et attentum et docilem reddat aliquis auditorem; et hoc maxime in admirabili genere cause, ut ipsemet Tullius dicit. (49) With reference to the first part it must be observed that to make a good exordium three things are requisite, as Tully says in his New Rhetoric; that the hearer, namely, should be rendered favourably disposed, attentive, and willing to learn; and this is especially needful in the case of a subject which is out of the common, as Tully himself remarks.
(50) Cum ergo materia circa quam versatur presens tractatus sit admirabilis, et propterea ad admirabile reducenda, ista tria intenduntur in principio exordii sive prologi. Nam dicit se dicturum ea que vidit in primo celo et retinere mente potuit. (50) Inasmuch, then, as the subject dealt with in the present work is out of the common, it is the aim of the first part of the exordium or prologue to bring about the above-mentioned three results with regard to this out-of-the-way subject. For the author declares that he will relate such things as he who beheld them in the first heaven was able to retain.
(51) In quo dicto omnia illa tria comprehenduntur; nam in utilitate dicendorum benivolentia paratur; in admirabilitate attentio; in possibilitate docilitas. Utilitatem innuit, cum recitaturum se dicit ea que maxime allectiva sunt desiderii humani, scilicet gaudia Paradisi; admirabilitatem tangit, cum promittit se tam ardua tam sublimia dicere, scilicet conditiones regni celestis; possibilitatem ostendit, cum dicit se dicturum que mente retinere potuit; si enim ipse, et alii poterunt. (51) In which statement all those three things are comprised; for the profitableness of what he is about to be told begets a favourable disposition in the hearer; its being out of the common engages his attention; and its being within the range of possibility renders him willing to learn. Its profitableness he gives to be understood when he says that he shall tell of that which above all things excites the longing of mankind, namely the joys of Paradise; its uncommon nature is indicated when he promises to treat of such exalted and sublime matters as the conditions of the celestial kingdom; its being within the range of possibility is demonstrated when he says that he will tell of those things which he was able to retain in his mind -- for if he was able, so will others be also.
(52) Hec omnia tanguntur in verbis illis ubi dicit se fuisse in primo celo, et quod dicere vult de regno celesti quicquid in mente sua, quasi thesaurum, potuit retinere. Viso igitur de bonitate ac perfectione prime partis prologi, ad litteram accedatur. (52) All this is indicated in the passage where he declares that he had been in the first heaven, and that he purposes to relate concerning the celestial kingdom whatsoever he was able to store up, like a treasure, in his mind. Having thus noted the excellence and perfection of the first part of the prologue, we may now proceed to the literal exposition. 
(53) [20]. Dicit ergo quod 'gloria primi Motoris', qui Deus est, 'in omnibus partibus universi resplendet', sed ita ut 'in aliqua parte magis, et in aliqua minus'. (53) He says, then, that 'the glory of the First Mover', which is God, 'shines forth in every part of the universe', but in such wise that it shines 'in one part more and in another less'.
(54) Quod autem ubique resplendeat, ratio et auctoritas manifestat. Ratio sic: Omne quod est, aut habet esse a se, aut ab alio: sed constat quod habere esse a se non convenit nisi uni, scilicet primo seu principio, qui Deus est; cum habere esse non arguat per se necesse esse, et per se necesse esse non competat nisi uni, scilicet primo seu principio, quod est causa omnium; ergo omnia que sunt, preter unum ipsum, habent esse ab alio. (54) That it shines in every part both reason and authority declare. Reason thus: Everything which exists has its being either from itself, or from some other thing. But it is plain that self-existence can be the attribute of one being only, namely the First or Beginning, which is God, since to have being does not argue necessary self-existence, and necessary self-existence appertains to one being only, namely the First or Beginning, which is the cause of all things; therefore everything which exists, except that One itself, has its being from some other thing.
(55) Si ergo accipiatur ultimum in universo, non quodcunque, manifestum est quod id habet esse ab aliquo; et illud a quo habet, a se vel ab aliquo habet. Si a se, sic est primum; si ab aliquo, et illud similiter vel a se vel ab aliquo. Et esset sic procedere in infinitum in causis agentibus, ut probatur in secundo Metaphysicorum, erit devenire ad primum, qui Deus est. (55) If, then, we take, not any thing whatsoever, but that thing which is the most remote in the universe, it is manifest that this has its being from something; and that from which it derives either has its being from itself, or from something else. If from itself, then it is primal; if from something else, then that again must either be self-existent, or derive from something else. But in this way we should go on to infinity in the chain of effective causes, as is shown in the second book of the Metaphysics.
(56) Et sic, mediate vel inmediate, omne quod habet esse habet esse ab eo; quia ex eo quod causa secunda recipit a prima, influit super causatum ad modum recipientis et reddentis radium, propter quod causa prima est magis causa. (56) So we must come to a primal existence, which is God. Hence, mediately or immediately, everything that exists has its being from Him, because, inasmuch as the second cause has its effect from the first, its influence on what it acts upon is like that of a body which receives and reflects a ray; since the first cause is the more effective cause.
(57) Et hoc dicitur in libro De Causis quod «omnis causa primaria plus influit super suum causatum quam causa universalis secunda». Sed hoc quantum ad esse. (57) And this is stated in the book On Causes, namely, that 'every primary cause has influence in a greater degree on what it acts upon than any second cause'. So much with regard to being.
(58) [21]. Quantum vero ad essentiam, probo sic: Omnis essentia, preter primam, est causata, aliter essent plura que essent per se necesse esse, quod est impossibile: quod causatum, vel a natura est vel ab intellectu, et quod a natura, per consequens causatum est ab intellectu, cum natura sit opus intelligentie; omne ergo quod est causatum, est causatum ab aliquo intellectu vel mediate vel inmediate. (58) With regard to essence I argue in this wise: Every essence, except the first, is caused; otherwise there would be more than one necessarily self-existent being, which is impossible. For what is caused is the effect either of nature or of intellect; and what is of nature is, consequently, caused by intellect, inasmuch as nature is the work of intelligence. Everything, then, which is caused is the effect, mediately or immediately, of some intellect.
(59) Cum ergo virtus sequatur essentiam cuius est virtus, si essentia intellectiva, est tota et unius que causat. Et sic quemadmodum prius devenire erat ad primam causam ipsius esse, sic nunc essentie et virtutis. (59) Since, then, virtue follows the essence whose virtue it is, if the essence is of intellect, the virtue is wholly and solely of the intellectual essence whose effect it is. And so, just as we had to go back to a first cause in the case of being, so now we must do so in the case of essence and of virtue.
(60) Propter quod patet quod omnis essentia et virtus procedat a prima, et intelligentie inferiores recipiant quasi a radiante, et reddant radios superioris ad suum inferius ad modum speculorum. Quod satis aperte tangere videtur Dionysius de Celesti Hierarchia loquens. (60) Whence it is evident that every essence and every virtue proceeds from a primal one; and that the lower intelligences have their effect as it were from a radiating body, and, after the fashion of mirrors, reflect the rays of the higher to the one below them. Which matter appears to be discussed clearly enough by Dionysius in his work On the Celestial Hierarchy.
(61) Et propter hoc dicitur in libro De Causis quod «omnis intelligentia est plena formis». Patet ergo quomodo ratio manifestat divinum lumen, id est divinam bonitatem, sapientiam et virtutem, resplendere ubique. (61) And therefore it is stated in the book On Causes that 'every intelligence is full of forms'. Reason, then, as we have seen, demonstrates that the divine light, that is to say the divine goodness, wisdom, and virtue, shines in every part.
(62) [22]. Similiter etiam et scientius facit auctoritas. Dicit enim Spiritus Sanctus per Hieremiam: «Celum et terram ego impleo»; et in Psalmo: «Quo ibo a spiritu tuo? et quo a facie tua fugiam? Si ascendero in celum, tu illic es; si descendero in infernum, ades. Si sumpsero pennas meas etc.». Et Sapientia dicit quod «Spiritus Domini replevit orbem terrarum». Et Ecclesiasticus in quadragesimo secundo: «Gloria Domini plenum est opus eius». (62) Authority likewise declares the same, but with more knowledge. For the Holy Spirit says by the mouth of Jeremiah: 'Do not I fill heaven and earth?' And in the Psalm: 'Whither shall I go from thy Spirit? and whither shall I flee from thy presence? If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there; if I descend into hell, thou art there also. If I take my wings,' &c. And Wisdom says: 'The Spirit of the Lord hath filled the whole world'. And Ecclesiasticus, in the forty-second chapter: 'His work is full of the glory of the Lord'.
(63) Quod etiam scriptura paganorum contestatur; unde Lucanus in nono: «Iuppiter est quodcunque vides, quocunque moveris». (63) To which also the writings of the pagans bear witness; for Lucan says in his ninth book: 'Jupiter is whatever thou seest, wherever thou goest'.
(64) [23]. Bene ergo dictum est cum dicit quod divinus radius sive divina gloria, 'per universum penetrat et resplendet': penetrat, quantum ad essentiam; resplendet, quantum ad esse. (64) He says well, then, when he says that the divine ray, or divine glory, 'penetrates and shines through the universe'; penetrates, as to essence; shines forth, as to being.
(65) Quod autem subicit de 'magis et minus', habet veritatem in manifesto; quoniam videmus in aliquo excellentiori gradu essentiam aliquam, aliquam vero in inferiori; ut patet de celo et elementis, quorum quidem illud incorruptibile, illa vero corruptibilia sunt. (65) And what he adds as to 'more and less' is manifestly true, since we see that one essence exists in a more excellent degree, and another in a less; as is clearly the case with regard to the heaven and the elements, the former being incorruptible, while the latter are corruptible.
(66) [24]. Et postquam premisit hanc veritatem, prosequitur ab ea circumloquens Paradisum; et dicit quod fuit in celo illo quod de gloria Dei, sive de luce, recipit affluentius. (66) And having premised this truth, he next goes on to indicate Paradise by a circumlocution; and says that he was in that heaven which receives the glory of God, or his light, in most bountiful measure.
(67) Propter quod sciendum quod illud celum est celum supremum, continens corpora universa et a nullo contentum, intra quod omnia corpora moventur, ipso in sempiterna quiete permanente ««« et a nulla corporali substantia virtutem recipiens. (67) As to which it must be understood that that heaven is the highest heaven, which contains all the bodies of the universe, and is contained by none, within which all bodies move (itself remaining everlastingly at rest), and which receives virtue from no corporeal substance.
(68) Et dicitur empyreum, quod est idem quod celum igne sui ardoris flagrans; non quod in eo sit ignis vel ardor materialis, sed spiritualis, quod est amor sanctus sive caritas. (68) And it is called the Empyrean, which is as much as to say, the heaven glowing with fire or heat; not that there is material fire or heat therein, but spiritual, which is holy love, or charity. 
(69) [25]. Quod autem de divina luce plus recipiat, potest probari per duo: primo, per suum omnia continere et a nullo contineri; secundo, per sempiternam suam quietem sive pacem. (69) Now, that this heaven receives more of the divine light than any other can be proved by two things. Firstly, by its containing all things, and being contained by none; secondly, by its state of everlasting rest or peace.
(70) Quantum ad primum probatur sic: Continens se habet ad contentum in naturali situ sicut formativum ad formabile, ut habetur in quarto Physicorum: sed in naturali situ totius universi primum celum est omnia continens; ergo se habet ad omnia sicut formativum ad formabile, quod est se habere per modum cause. Et cum omnis vis causandi sit radius quidam influens a prima causa que Deus est, manifestum est quod illud celum quod magis habet rationem cause, magis de luce divina recipit. (70) As to the first the proof is as follows: The containing body stands in the same relation to the content in natural position as the formative does to the formable, as we are told in the fourth book of the Physics. But in the natural position of the whole universe the first heaven is the heaven which contains all things; consequently it is related to all things as the formative to the formable, which is to be in the relation of cause to effect. And since every causative force is in the nature of a ray emanating from the first cause, which is God, it is manifest that that heaven which is in the highest degree causative receives most of the divine light.
(71) [26]. Quantum ad secundum, probatur sic: Omne quod movetur, movetur propter aliquid quod non habet, quod est terminus sui motus; sicut celum lune movetur propter aliquam partem sui, que non habet illud ubi ad quod movetur; et quia sui pars quelibet non adepto quolibet ubi, quod est impossibile, movetur ad aliud, inde est quod semper movetur et nunquam quiescit, et est eius appetitus. Et quod dico de celo lune, intelligendum est de omnibus, preter primum. Omne ergo quod movetur est in aliquo defectu, et non habet totum suum esse simul. (71) As to the second the proof is this: Everything which has motion moves because of something which it has not, and which is the terminus of its motion. The heaven of the moon, for instance, moves because of some part of itself which has not attained the station towards which it is moving; and because no part whatsoever of it has attained any terminus whatsoever (as indeed it never can), it moves to another station, and thus is always in motion, and is never at rest, which is what it desires. And what I say of the heaven of the moon applies to all the other heavens, except the first. Everything, then, which has motion is in some respect defective, and has not its whole being complete.
(72) Illud igitur celum quod a nullo movetur, in se in qualibet sui parte habet quicquid potest modo perfecto, ita quod motu non indiget ad suam perfectionem. Et cum omnis perfectio sit radius primi, quod est in summo gradu perfectionis; manifestum est quod celum primum magis recipit de luce primi, qui est Deus. (72) That heaven, therefore, which is subject to no movement, in itself and in every part whatsoever of itself has whatever it is capable of having in perfect measure, so that it has no need of motion for its perfection. And since every perfection is a ray of the Primal One, inasmuch as He is perfection in the highest degree, it is manifest that the first heaven receives more than any other of the light of the Primal One, which is God.
(73) Ista tamen ratio videtur arguere ad destructionem antecedentis, ita quod simpliciter et secundum formam arguendi non probat. Sed si consideremus materiam eius, bene probat, quia de quodam sempiterno, in quo potest defectus sempiternari: ita quod, si Deus non dedit sibi motum, patet quod non dedit sibi materiam in aliquo egentem. (73) This reasoning, however, has the appearance of an argument based on the denial of the antecedent, in that it is not a direct proof and according to syllogistic form. But if we consider its content it is a good proof, because it deals with a thing eternal, and assumes it to be capable of being eternally defective; so that, if God did not give that heaven motion, it is evident that He did not give it material in any respect defective.
(74) Et per hanc suppositionem tenet argumentum ratione materie; et est similis modus arguendi ac si dicerem: Si homo est, est risibile; nam in omnibus convertibilibus tenet similis ratio gratia materie. Sic ergo patet: quod cum dicit 'in illo celo, quod plus de luce Dei recipit', intelligit circumloqui Paradisum, sive celum empyreum. (74) And on this supposition the argument holds good by reason of the content; and this form of argument is much the same as though we should reason: 'if he is man, he is able to laugh'; for in every convertible proposition a like reasoning holds good by virtue of the content. Hence it is clear that when the author says 'in that heaven which receives more of the light of God', he intends by a circumlocution to indicate Paradise, or the heaven of the Empyrean.
(75) [27]. Premissis quoque rationibus consonanter dicit Phylosophus in primo De Celo quod celum «tanto habet honorabiliorem materiam istis inferioribus, quanto magis elongatum est ab hiis que hic». (75) And in agreement with the foregoing is what the Philosopher says in the first book On Heaven, namely that 'a heaven has so much the more honourable material than those below it as it is the further removed from terrestrial things'.
(76) Ad hoc etiam posset adduci quod dicit Apostolus ad Ephesios de Christo: «Qui ascendit super omnes celos, ut adimpleret omnia». Hoc est celum delitiarum Domini; de quibus delitiis dicitur contra Luciferum per Ezechielem: «Tu signaculum similitudinis, sapientia plenus et perfectione decorus in deliciis Paradisi Dei fuisti». (76) In addition to which might be adduced what the Apostle says to the Ephesians of Christ: 'Who ascended up far above all heavens, that He might fill all things'. This is the heaven of the delights of the Lord; of which delights it is said by Ezekiel against Lucifer: 'Thou, the seal of similitude, full of wisdom, beautiful in perfection, wast in the delights of the Paradise of God'.
(77) [28]. Et postquam dixit quod fuit in loco illo Paradisi per suam circumlocutionem, prosequitur dicens se vidisse aliqua que recitare non potest qui descendit. Et reddit causam dicens 'quod intellectus in tantum profundat se' in ipsum 'desiderium suum', quod est Deus, 'quod memoria sequi non potest'. (77) And after he has said that he was in that place of Paradise which he describes by circumlocution, he goes on to say that he saw certain things which he who descends therefrom is powerless to relate. And he gives the reason, saying that 'the intellect plunges itself to such depth' in its very longing, which is for God, 'that the memory cannot follow'.
(78) Ad que intelligenda sciendum est quod intellectus humanus in hac vita, propter connaturalitatem et affinitatem quam habet ad substantiam intellectualem separatam, quando elevatur, in tantum elevatur, ut memoria post reditum deficiat propter transcendisse humanum modum. (78) For the understanding of which it must be noted that the human intellect in this life, by reason of its connaturality and affinity to the separate intellectual substance, when in exaltation, reaches such a height of exaltation that after its return to itself memory fails, since it has transcended the range of human faculty.
(79) Et hoc insinuatur nobis per Apostolum ad Corinthios loquentem, ubi dicit: «Scio hominem, sive in corpore sive extra corpus, nescio, Deus scit, raptum usque ad tertium celum, et vidit arcana Dei, que non licet homini loqui». Ecce, postquam humanam rationem intellectus ascensione transierat, quid extra se ageretur non recordabatur. (79) And this is conveyed to us by the Apostle where he says, addressing the Corinthians: 'I know a man (whether in the body, or out of the body, I cannot tell; God knoweth) how that he was caught up to the third heaven, and heard unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter'. Behold, after the intellect had passed beyond the bounds of human faculty in its exaltation, it could not recall what took place outside of its range.
(80) Et hoc est insinuatum nobis in Matheo, ubi tres discipuli ceciderunt in faciem suam, nihil postea recitantes, quasi obliti. Et in Ezechiele scribitur: «Vidi. et cecidi in faciem meam». Et ubi ista invidis non sufficiant, legant Richardum de Sancto Victore in libro De Contemplatione, legant Bernardum in libro De Consideratione, legant Augustinum in libro De Quantitate Anime, et non invidebunt. (80) This again is conveyed to us in Matthew, where we read that the three disciples fell on their faces, and record nothing thereafter, as though memory had failed them. And in Ezekiel it is written: 'And when I saw it, I fell upon my face'. And should these not satisfy the cavillers, let them read Richard of St.Victor in his book On Contemplation ; let them read Bernard in his book On Consideration; let them read Augustine in his book On the Capacity of the Soul ; and they will cease from their cavilling.
(81) Si vero in dispositionem elevationis tante propter peccatum loquentis oblatrarent, legant Danielem, ubi et Nabuchodonosor invenient contra peccatores aliqua vidisse divinitus, oblivionique mandasse. (81) But if on account of the sinfulness of the speaker they should cry out against his claim to have reached such a height of exaltation, let them read Daniel, where they will find that even Nebuchadnezzar by divine permission beheld certain things as a warning to sinners, and straightway forgot them.
(82) Nam «qui oriri solem suum facit super bonos et malos, et pluit super iustos et iniustos», aliquando misericorditer ad conversionem, aliquando severe ad punitionem, plus et minus, ut vult, gloriam suam quantumcunque male viventibus manifestat. (82) For He 'who maketh his sun to shine on the good and on the evil, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust', sometimes in compassion for their conversion, sometimes in wrath for their chastisement, in greater or lesser measure, according as He wills, manifests his glory to evil-doers, be they ever so evil.
(83) [29]. Vidit ergo, ut dicit, aliqua 'que referre nescit et nequit rediens'. Diligenter quippe notandum est quod dicit 'nescit et nequit': nescit quia oblitus, nequit quia, si recordatur et contentum tenet, sermo tamen deficit. (83) He saw, then, as he says, certain things 'which he who returns has neither knowledge nor power to relate'. Now it must be carefully noted that he says 'has neither knowledge nor power' -- knowledge he has not, because he has forgotten; power he has not, because even if he remembers, and retains it thereafter, nevertheless speech fails him.
(84) Multa namque per intellectum videmus quibus signa vocalia desunt: quod satis Plato insinuat in suis libris per assumptionem metaphorismorum; multa enim per lumen intellectuale vidit que sermone proprio nequivit exprimere. (84) For we perceive many things by the intellect for which language has no terms -- a fact which Plato indicates plainly enough in his books by his employment of metaphors; for he perceived many things by the light of the intellect which his everyday language was inadequate to express.
(85) [30]. Postea dicit se dicturum illa que de regno celesti retinere potuit, et hoc dicit esse 'materiam' sui operis; que qualia sint et quanta, in parte executiva patebit. (85) Afterwards the author says that he will relate concerning the celestial kingdom such things as he was able to retain; and he says that this is the subject of his work; the nature and extent of which things will be shown in the executive part.
(86) [31]. Deinde cum dicit: 'O bone Apollo', etc., facit invocationem suam. Et dividitur ista pars in partes duas: in prima invocando petit; in secunda suadet Apollini petitionem factam, remunerationem quandam prenuntians; et incipit secunda pars ibi: 'O divina virtus'. (86) Then when he says: 'O buono Apollo', &c., he makes his invocation. And this part is divided into two parts -- in the first, he invokes the deity and makes a petition; in the second, he inclines Apollo to the granting of his petition by the promise of a certain recompense; which second part begins: 'O divina virtù'.
(87) Prima pars dividitur in partes duas: in prima petit divinum auxilium, in secunda tangit necessitatem sue petitionis, quod est iustificare ipsam, ibi: 'Hucusque alterum iugum Parnassi' etc. (87) The first part again is divided into two parts--in the first, he prays for divine aid; in the second, he adverts to the necessity for his petition, whereby he justifies it; and this part begins: 'Infino a qui l'un giogo di Parnaso', &c.
(88) [32]. Hec est sententia secunde partis prologi in generali. In speciali vero non exponam ad presens; urget enim me rei familiaris angustia, ut hec et alia utilia reipublice derelinquere oporteat. Sed spero de Magnificentia vestra ita ut alias habeatur procedendi ad utilem expositionem facultas. (88) This is the general meaning of the second part of the prologue; the particular meaning I shall not expound on the present occasion; for anxiety as to my domestic affairs presses so heavily upon me that I must perforce abandon this and other tasks of public utility. I trust, however, that your Magnificence may afford me the opportunity to continue this useful exposition at some other time.
(89) [33]. In parte vero executiva, que fuit divisa iuxta totum prologum, nec dividendo nec sententiando quicquam dicetur ad presens, nisi hoc, quod ubique procedetur ascendendo de celo in celum, et recitabitur de animabus beatis inventis in quolibet orbe, et quod vera illa beatitudo in sentiendo veritatis principium consistit; ut patet per Iohannem ibi: «Hec est vita eterna, ut cognoscant te Deum verum etc.»; et per Boetium in tertio De Consolatione ibi: «Te cernere finis». Inde est quod ad ostendendum gloriam beatitudinis in illis animabus, ab eis tanquam videntibus omnem veritatem multa querentur que magnam habent utilitatem et delectationem. (89) With regard to the executive part of the work, which was divided after the same manner as the prologue taken as a whole, I shall say nothing either as to its divisions or its interpretation at present; save only that the process of the narrative will be by ascent from heaven to heaven, and that an account will be given of the blessed spirits who are met with in each sphere; and that their true blessedness consists in the apprehension of Him who is the beginning of truth, as appears from what John says: 'This is life eternal, to know thee the true God', &c.; and from what Boethius says in his third book On Consolation: 'To behold thee is the end'. Hence it is that, in order to reveal the glory of the blessedness of those spirits, many things which have great profit and delight will be asked of them, as of those who behold the fullness of truth.
(90) Et quia, invento principio seu primo, videlicet Deo, nichil est quod ulterius queratur, cum sit Alfa et O, idest principium et finis, ut visio Iohannis designat, in ipso Deo terminatur tractatus, qui est benedictus in secula seculorum. (90) And since, when the Beginning or First, which is God, has been reached, there is nought to be sought for beyond, inasmuch as He is Alpha and Omega, that is, the Beginning and the End, as the Vision of John tells us, the work ends in God Himself, who is blessed for evermore, world without end.