(1) Amplius, si Ecclesia virtutem haberet auctorizandi romanum Principem, aut haberet a Deo, aut a se, aut ab Imperatore aliquo aut ab universo mortalium assensu, vel saltem ex illis prevalentium: nulla est alia rimula, per quam virtus hec ad Ecclesiam manare potuisset; sed a nullo istorum habet: ergo virtutem predictam non habet. |
(1) Moreover, if the church had the power to confer authority on the Roman Prince, it would have it either from God, or from itself, or from some Emperor, or from the consent of all men or at least the most exceptional among them; there is no other channel by which this power could have flowed to the church; but it does not derive it from any of these; therefore it does not have the said power. |
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(2) Quod autem a nullo istorum habeat sic apparet. Nam si a Deo recepisset, hoc fuisset aut per legem divinam aut per naturalem, quia quod a natura recipitur a Deo recipitur, non tamen convertitur. |
(2) That it does not derive it from any of these can be shown as follows. For if it had received it from God, this would have been either by divine law or by natural law, because what comes from nature comes from God, although the converse is not true. |
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(3) Sed non per naturalem, quia natura non imponit legem nisi suis effectibus, cum Deus insufficiens esse non possit ubi sine secundis agentibus aliquid in esse producit. Unde, cum Ecclesia non sit effectus nature, sed Dei dicentis «Super hanc petram hedificabo Ecclesiam meam», et alibi «Opus consummavi quod dedisti michi ut faciam», manifestum est quod ei natura legem non dedit. |
(3) But it did not come by natural law, because nature imposes laws only on its own effects, since when God brings something into being without secondary agents he cannot be less than perfect. Thus, since the church is not an effect of nature, but of God who said: "Upon this rock I will build my church", and elsewhere: "I have finished the work which thou gavest me to do", it is apparent that it is not nature which gave its law to the church. |
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(4) Sed nec per divinam: omnis nanque divina lex duorum Testamentorum gremio continetur; in quo quidem gremio reperire non possum temporalium sollicitudinem sive curam sacerdotio primo vel novissimo commendatam fuisse. |
(4) But it did not come by divine law either, for the whole of divine law is encompassed within the two Testaments, and I am quite unable to find in them that involvement in or concern for temporal things was recommended to the first or the later priesthood. |
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(5) Quinymo invenio sacerdotes primos ab illa de precepto remotos, ut patet per ea que Deus ad Moysen; et sacerdotes novissimos, per ea que Cristus ad discipulos: quam quidem ab eis esse remotam possibile non est, si regiminis temporalis auctoritas a sacerdotio demanaret, cum saltem in auctorizando sollicitudo provisionis instaret, et deinde cautela continua ne auctorizatus a tramite rectitudinis deviaret. |
(5) On the contrary I find that the first priests were expressly enjoined to keep aloof from such involvement, as is clear from God's words to Moses; as were the priests of the new order in Christ's words to his disciples; freedom from such involvement would not be possible if the authority of temporal power flowed from the priesthood, since at the very least it would have had the responsibility for taking action to confer authority, and then for continual watchfulness lest the person on whom authority had been conferred deviate from the path of righteousness. |
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(6) Quod autem a se non receperit de facili patet. Nichil est quod dare possit quod non habet; unde omne agens aliquid actu esse tale oportet quale agere intendit, ut habetur in hiis que De simpliciter ente. Sed constat quod, si Ecclesia sibi dedit illam virtutem, non habebat illam priusquam daret; et sic dedisset sibi quod non habebat: quod est inpossibile. |
(6) That the church did not receive this power from itself can easily be proved. There is nothing which can give what it does not possess; and so every agent must be in actuality like the thing which it intends to produce, as we see from the Metaphysics. But it is clear that if the church gave itself that power, it did not have it before it gave it; and thus it would have given itself what it did not possess, which is impossible. |
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(7) Quod vero ab aliquo Imperatore non receperit, per ea que superius manifesta sunt patet sufficienter. Et quod etiam ab assensu omnium vel prevalentium non habuerit quis dubitat, cum non modo Asyani et Affricani omnes, quinetiam maior pars Europam colentium hoc aborreat? Fastidium etenim est in rebus manifestissimis probationes adducere. |
(7) That it did not receive it from some Emperor is sufficiently clear from what was proved earlier. And who can doubt that it did not receive it from the consent of all men or of the most exceptional among them, given that not only all Asians and Africans, but also the greater part of those who live in Europe find the idea abhorrent? It is tedious to offer proofs in matters which are self-evident. |
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