Monarchia (III, x, 1-20)

(1) Dicunt adhuc quidam quod Constantinus imperator, mundatus a lepra intercessione Silvestri tunc summi Pontificis, Imperii sedem, scilicet Romam, donavit Ecclesie cum multis aliis Imperii dignitatibus. (1) Again, some people maintain that the Emperor Constantine, cured of leprosy by the intercession of Sylvester who was then supreme Pontiff, made a gift to the church of the seat of Empire (i.e. Rome), along with many other imperial privileges.
(2) Ex quo arguunt dignitates illas deinde neminem assummere posse nisi ab Ecclesia recipiat, cuius eas esse dicunt; et ex hoc bene sequeretur auctoritatem unam ab alia dependere, ut ipsi volunt. (2) From this they argue that since that time no one can take on those imperial privileges unless he receives them from the church, to whom (they say) they belong; and it would indeed follow from this that the one authority was dependent on the other, as they claim.
(3) Positis et solutis igitur argumentis que radices in divinis eloquiis habere videbantur, restant nunc illa ponenda et solvenda que in gestis humanis et ratione humana radicantur. Ex quibus primum est quod premictitur, quod sic sillogizant: 'ea que sunt Ecclesie nemo de iure habere potest nisi ab Ecclesia' -- et hoc conceditur -- 'romanum regimen est Ecclesie: ergo ipsum nemo habere potest de iure nisi ab Ecclesia'; et minorem probant per ea que de Constantino superius tacta sunt. (3) Having stated and refuted those arguments which appeared to be based on the word of God, it now remains to state and refute those which are based on human actions and human reason. The first of these is the one just referred to, which they formulate as a syllogism in this way: "those things which belong to the church can only be held legitimately by someone to whom the church has granted them" (and this we concede); "Roman sovereign authority belongs to the church; therefore no one can hold it legitimately unless granted it by the church"; and they prove the minor premiss with reference to what was touched on earlier about Constantine.
(4) Hanc ergo minorem interimo et, cum probant, dico quod sua probatio nulla est, quia Constantinus alienare non poterat Imperii dignitatem, nec Ecclesia recipere. (4) It is this minor premiss which I therefore deny, and when they "prove" it I say that their "proof" proves nothing, because Constantine was not in a position to give away the privileges of empire, nor was the church in a position to accept them.
(5) Et cum pertinaciter instant, quod dico sic ostendi potest: nemini licet ea facere per offitium sibi deputatum que sunt contra illud offitium; quia sic idem, in quantum idem, esset contrarium sibi ipsi: quod est inpossibile; sed contra offitium deputatum Imperatori est scindere Imperium, cum offitium eius sit humanum genus uni velle et uni nolle tenere subiectum, ut in primo huius de facili videri potest; ergo scindere Imperium imperatori non licet. (5) And if they stubbornly insist, my point can be proved in this way: nobody has the right to do things because of an office he holds which are in conflict with that office, otherwise one and the same thing would oppose itself in its own nature, which is impossible; but to divide the empire is in conflict with the office bestowed on the emperor, since his task is to hold mankind in obedience to a single will (its commands and its prohibitions), as can easily be seen from the first book of this treatise; therefore the emperor is not allowed to divide the empire.
(6) Si ergo alique dignitates per Constantinum essent alienate -- ut dicunt -- ab Imperio, et cessissent in potestatem Ecclesie, scissa esset tunica inconsutilis, quam scindere ausi non sunt etiam qui Cristum verum Deum lancea perforarunt. (6) Thus if certain privileges had been taken away from the empire by Constantine, as they maintain, and had passed into the control of the church, that seamless garment would have been torn which even those who pierced Christ the true God with their lance dared not divide.
(7) Preterea, sicut Ecclesia suum habet fundamentum, sic et Imperium suum. Nam Ecclesie fundamentum Cristus est; unde Apostolus ad Corinthios: «Fundamentum aliud nemo potest ponere preter id quod positum est, quod est Cristus Iesus». Ipse est petra super quam hedificata est Ecclesia. Imperii vero fundamentum ius humanum est. (7) Moreover, just as the church has its foundation, so too the empire has its own. For the foundation of the church is Christ; hence the Apostle in Corinthians says: "For other foundation can no man lay than that is laid, which is Jesus Christ". He is the rock on which the church is built. But the foundation of the empire is human right.
(8) Modo dico quod, sicut Ecclesie fundamento suo contrariari non licet, sed debet semper inniti super illud iuxta illud Canticorum «Que est ista, que ascendit de deserto delitiis affluens, innixa super dilectum?», sic et Imperio licitum non est contra ius humanum aliquid facere. Sed contra ius humanum esset, si se ipsum Imperium destrueret: ergo Imperio se ipsum destruere non licet. (8) Now I say that, just as the church is not allowed to act against its own foundation, but must always rest upon it, in accordance with those words in the Song of Solomon: "Who is this that cometh up from the wilderness, flowing with delights, leaning upon her beloved?", so too the empire is not allowed to do anything which is in conflict with human right. But if the empire were to destroy itself that would conflict with human right: therefore the empire is not allowed to destroy itself.
(9) Cum ergo scindere Imperium esset destruere ipsum, consistente Imperio in unitate Monarchie universalis, manifestum est quod Imperii auctoritate fungenti scindere Imperium non licet. Quod autem destruere Imperium sit contra ius humanum, ex superioribus est manifestum. (9) Therefore since to divide the empire would be to destroy it - for empire consists precisely in the unity of universal monarchy - it is clear that whoever embodies imperial authority is not allowed to divide the empire. For it is clear from what was said earlier that to destroy the empire is in conflict with human right.
(10) Preterea, omnis iurisdictio prior est suo iudice: iudex enim ad iurisdictionem ordinatur, et non e converso; sed Imperium est iurisdictio omnem temporalem iurisdictionem ambitu suo comprehendens: ergo ipsa est prior suo iudice, qui est Imperator, quia ad ipsam imperator est ordinatus, et non e converso. Ex quo patet quod imperator ipsam permutare non potest in quantum Imperator, cum ab ea recipiat esse quod est. (10) Moreover, all jurisdiction is prior to the judge who exercises it, for the judge is appointed for the sake of the jurisdiction, and not vice versa; but the empire is a jurisdiction which embraces within its scope every other temporal jurisdiction: therefore it is prior to its judge, who is the emperor, for the emperor is appointed for its sake, and not vice versa. From this it is clear that the emperor, precisely as emperor, cannot change it, because he derives from it the fact that he is what he is.
(11) Modo dico sic: aut ille Imperator erat cum dicitur Ecclesie contulisse, aut non; et si non, planum est quod nichil poterat de Imperio conferre; si sic, cum talis collatio esset minoratio iurisdictionis, in quantum Imperator hoc facere non poterat. (11) Now I say this: either he was emperor when he is said to have conferred this power on the church, or he was not; if he was not, then it is obvious that he could not give away any part of the empire; if he was, since such a conferring of power would be a lessening of his own jurisdiction, then precisely because he was emperor he could not do it.
(12) Amplius, si unus Imperator aliquam particulam ab Imperii iurisdictione discindere posset, eadem ratione et alius. Et cum iurisdictio temporalis finita sit et omne finitum per finitas decisiones assummatur, sequeretur quod iurisdictio prima posset annichilari: quod est irrationabile. (12) Besides, if one emperor could cut off some portion of the jurisdiction of the empire, then so could another on the same grounds. And since temporal jurisdiction is finite and every finite thing can be destroyed by a finite series of subdivisions, it would follow that the primary jurisdiction could be entirely obliterated; and this is against reason.
(13) Adhuc, cum conferens habeat se per modum agentis et cui confertur per modum patientis, ut placet Phylosopho in quarto ad Nicomacum, non solum ad collationem esse licitam requiritur dispositio conferentis, sed etiam eius cui confertur: videtur enim in patiente et disposito actus activorum inesse. (13) Again, since a person who gives functions as an agent, and a person who receives as a patient, as Aristotle says in the fourth book of the Ethics, for a donation to be legitimate requires a suitable disposition not just in the giver, but in the recipient as well: "for it seems that the action of active agents is transferred to the patient if he is disposed to receive it".
(14) Sed Ecclesia omnino indisposita erat ad temporalia recipienda per preceptum prohibitivum expressum, ut habemus per Matheum sic: «Nolite possidere aurum, neque argentum, neque pecuniam in zonis vestris, non peram in via» etc. Nam etsi per Lucam habemus relaxationem precepti quantum ad quedam, ad possessionem tamen auri et argenti licentiatam Ecclesiam post prohibitionem illam invenire non potui. (14) But the church was utterly unsuited to receiving temporal things because of the command which expressly forbade it, as we gather from these words in Matthew: "Provide neither gold, nor silver, nor brass in your purses, nor scrip for your journey", etc. For even if in Luke we find that this command was relaxed with regard to certain things, yet I have been unable to find that after that prohibition the church was ever granted permission to possess gold and silver.
(15) Qua re, si Ecclesia recipere non poterat, dato quod Constantinus hoc facere potuisset de se, actio tamen illa non erat possibilis propter parientis indispositionem. Patet igitur quod nec Ecclesia recipere per modum possessionis, nec ille conferre per modum alienationis poterat. (15) And thus, if the church could not receive it, then even supposing that Constantine had been in a position to perform that action, nonetheless the action itself was not possible because of the unsuitability of the "patient" or recipient. It is therefore clear that the church could not accept it as a possession, nor Constantine give it as an irrevocable gift.
(16) Poterat tamen Imperator in patrocinium Ecclesie Patrimonium et alia deputare, inmoto semper superiori dominio, cuius unitas divisionem non patitur. (16) The emperor could however consign a patrimony and other resources to the guardianship of the church, provided it was without prejudice to the superior imperial authority, whose unity admits no division.
(17) Poterat et vicarius Dei recipere non tanquam possessor, sed tanquam fructuum pro Ecclesia pro Cristi pauperibus dispensator: quod apostolos fecisse non ignoratur. (17) And God's vicar could receive it, not as owner but as administrator of its fruits for the church and for Christ's poor, as the apostles are known to have done.