Monarchia (III, viii, 1-11)

(1) Item assummunt de lictera eiusdem illud Cristi ad Petrum: «Et quodcunque ligaveris super terram, erit ligatum et in celis; et quodcunque solveris super terram, erit solutum et in celis»; quod etiam omnibus apostolis est dictum. (1) They likewise take from the text of Matthew those words of Christ to Peter: "And whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven". This was also said to all the apostles.
(2) Similiter accipiunt de lictera Mathei, similiter et Iohannis: ex quo arguunt successorem Petri omnia de concessione Dei posse tam ligare quam solvere; et inde inferunt posse solvere leges et decreta Imperii, atque leges et decreta ligare pro regimine temporali: unde bene sequeretur illud quod dicunt. (2) They take the same thing from the text both of Matthew and of John. On this they base their argument that God has granted to Peter's successor the power to bind and loose all things; and they infer from this that he can "loose" the laws and decrees of the empire, and "bind" laws and decrees in the place of the temporal power; and what they claim would indeed logically follow.
(3) Et dicendum ad hoc per distinctionem circa maiorem sillogismi quo utuntur. Sillogizant enim sic: 'Petrus potuit solvere omnia et ligare; successor Petri potest quicquid Petrus potuit; ergo successor Petri potest omnia solvere et ligare'. Unde inferunt auctoritatem et decreta Imperii solvere et ligare ipsum posse. (3) This argument must be answered by drawing a distinction in relation to the major premiss of the syllogism they use. Their syllogism takes this form: "Peter could loose and bind all things; Peter's successor can do anything Peter could do; therefore Peter's successor can loose and bind all things". From this they deduce that he can loose and bind the authority and the decrees of the empire.
(4) Minorem concedo, maiorem vero non sine distinctione. Et ideo dico, quod hoc signum universale 'omne', quod includitur in 'quodcunque', nunquam distribuit extra ambitum termini distributi. (4) I grant the minor premiss, but I do not grant the major premiss without drawing a distinction. And thus I say that this universal sign "all", which is contained in "whatsoever", never refers beyond the scope of the term to which it refers.
(5) Nam si dico 'omne animal currit', 'omne' distribuit pro omni eo quod sub genere animalis comprehenditur; si vero dico 'omnis homo currit', tunc signum universale non distribuit nisi pro suppositis huius termini 'homo'; et cum dico 'omnis grammaticus', tunc distributio magis coartatur. (5) For example, if I say "all animals run", the word "all" refers to every creature which is included within the class "animal"; but if I say "all men run", then here the universal sign refers only to those beings that come into the category "man"; and when I say "all grammarians", then the range of reference is even narrower.
(6) Propter quod semper videndum est quid est quod signum universale habet distribuere: quo viso, facile apparebit quantum sua distributio dilatetur, cognita natura et ambitu termini distributi. (6) For this reason one must always take into consideration what it is that the universal sign refers to; having done so, and having established the nature and the scope of the term to which it refers, the range of its reference will be readily apparent.
(7) Unde cum dicitur 'quodcunque ligaveris', si illud 'quodcunque' summeretur absolute, verum esset quod dicunt; et non solum hoc facere posset, quin etiam solvere uxorem a viro et ligare ipsam alteri vivente primo: quod nullo modo potest. Posset etiam solvere me non penitentem: quod etiam facere ipse Deus non posset. (7) So when the statement is made "whatsoever thou shalt bind", if the word "whatsoever" were taken in an absolute sense, what they say would be true; and Peter could not only do that, but also loose a wife from her husband and bind her to another while the first was still alive; and this he certainly cannot do. He could also absolve me without my having repented, which even God himself could not do.
(8) Cum ergo ita sit, manifestum est quod non absolute summenda est illa distributio, sed respective ad aliquid. Quod autem illa respiciat satis est evidens considerato illo quod sibi conceditur, circa quod illa distributio subiungitur. (8) This being so then, it is clear that the range of reference is to be taken not in an absolute sense, but in relation to something. That it is to be taken in relation to something is clear enough when we consider what was granted to him, for it is precisely to this that the range of reference is linked.
(9) Dicit enim Cristus Petro: «Tibi dabo claves regni celorum», hoc est 'Faciam te hostiarium regni celorum'. Deinde subdit «et quodcunque»: quod est 'omne quod', id est 'et omne quod ad istud offitium spectabit solvere poteris et ligare'. (9) For Christ says to Peter: "I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven", that is: "I shall make you gate-keeper of the kingdom of heaven". He then adds "and whatsoever", which is to say "all that", i.e. "and all that pertains to this office thou shalt have the power to loose and bind".
(10) Et sic signum universale quod includitur in 'quodcunque' contrahitur in sua distributione ab offitio clavium regni celorum: et sic assummendo, vera est illa propositio; absolute vero non, ut patet. (10) And thus the universal sign which is contained in "whatsoever" is limited in its reference by the office of the keys of the kingdom of heaven; and if it is taken in this way, the proposition is true; but it is not true in an absolute sense, as is clear.
(11) Et ideo dico quod etsi successor Petri, secundum exigentiam offitii commissi Petro, possit solvere et ligare, non tamen propter hoc sequitur quod possit solvere seu ligare decreta Imperii sive leges ut ipsi dicebant, nisi ulterius probaretur hoc spectare ad offitium clavium: cuius contrarium inferius ostendetur. (11) And thus I say that, although Peter's successor can loose and bind as the office entrusted to Peter requires, nonetheless it does not follow from this that he can loose or bind the decrees or the laws of the empire, as they maintained, unless they were further to prove that this pertained to the office of the keys. That the opposite is the case will be demonstrated below.