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| (1) Assummunt etiam argumentum de lictera Moysi, dicentes quod de femore Iacob fluxit figura horum duorum regiminum, quia Levi et Iudas: quorum alter fuit pater sacerdotii, alter vero regiminis temporalis. Deinde sic arguunt ex hiis: sicut se habuit Levi ad Iudam, sic se habet Ecclesia ad Imperium; Levi precessit Iudam in nativitate, ut patet in Lictera: ergo Ecclesia precedit Imperium in auctoritate. | (1) They also take an argument from the text of Moses, saying that from the loins of Jacob there came forth a prefiguration of these two powers, in the persons of Levi and Judah: the one was the father of the priesthood, the other of temporal power. From this they go on to argue: the church stands in the same relation to the empire as Levi stood to Judah; Levi preceded Judah in his birth, as we read in the Biblical account; therefore the church precedes the empire in authority. | |
| (2) Et hoc vero de facili solvitur; nam cum dicunt quod Levi et Iudas, filii Iacob, figurant ista regimina, possem similiter hoc interimendo dissolvere: sed concedatur. | (2) Now this point too is easily refuted, for when they say that Levi and Judah, the sons of Jacob, prefigure those powers, I could refute it in the same way by denying the premiss; but let us concede it. | |
| (3) Et cum arguendo inferunt 'sicut Levi precedit in nativitate sic Ecclesia in auctoritate', dico similiter quod aliud est predicatum conclusionis et aliud maior extremitas: nam aliud est 'auctoritas' et aliud 'nativitas', subiecto et ratione; propter quod peccatur in forma. Et est similis processus huic: A precedit B in C; D et E se habent ut A et B: ergo D precedit E in F; F vero et C diversa sunt. | (3) And when by their reasoning they reach the conclusion "as Levi preceded in birth so the church precedes in authority", I say again that the predicate of the conclusion is a different thing from the predicate of the major premiss; for "authority" is one thing and "birth" another, both in respect of their subject and their meaning; and thus there is a logical flaw in the argument. And the reasoning goes like this: A precedes B in C; D is to E as A is to B; therefore D precedes E in F; but F and C are different things. | |
| (4) Et si ferrent instantiam dicentes quod F sequitur ad C, hoc est auctoritas ad nativitatem, et pro antecedente bene infertur consequens, ut animal pro homine, dico quod falsum est: multi enim sunt maiores natu qui non solum in auctoritate non precedunt, sed etiam preceduntur a iunioribus; ut patet ubi episcopi sunt tempore minores quam sui archipresbyteri. | (4) And if they object saying that F follows from C, that is authority follows from seniority by birth, and that the consequent can rightly be set in the place of the antecedent, as "animal" can be set in the place of "man", I say that this is false: for there are many people who have seniority by birth who not only do not rank higher in authority, but are in fact outranked by people younger than themselves; as is clearly the case where bishops are younger than their archdeacons. | |
| (5) Et sic instantia videtur errare secundum 'non causam ut causa'. | (5) And thus their objection is seen to be marred by the fallacy of "treating what is not a cause as a cause". | |