Monarchia (III, iv, 1-22)

(1) Isti vero ad quos erit tota disputatio sequens, asserentes auctoritatem Imperii ab auctoritate Ecclesie dependere velut artifex inferior dependet ab architecto, pluribus et diversis argumentis moventur; que quidem de Sacra Scriptura eliciunt et de quibusdam gestis tam summi Pontificis quam ipsius Imperatoris, nonnullum vero rationis indicium habere nituntur. (1) The whole of the argument which follows will therefore be addressed to those people who assert that the authority of the empire is dependent on the authority of the church in the same way as a builder is dependent on the architect. They are influenced by a number of different arguments, which they draw from the holy Scriptures and from certain actions both of the supreme Pontiff and the Emperor himself; but they seek to have some support from reason on their side as well.
(2) Dicunt enim primo, secundum scripturam Geneseos, quod Deus fecit duo magna luminaria -- luminare maius et luminare minus -- ut alterum preesset diei et alterum preesset nocti: que allegorice dicta esse intelligebant ista duo regimina: scilicet spirituale et temporale. (2) Firstly they say, basing themselves on Genesis, that God created "two great lights" - a greater light and a lesser light - so that one might rule the day and the other rule the night; these they took in an allegorical sense to mean the two powers, i.e. the spiritual and the temporal.
(3) Deinde arguunt quod, quemadmodum luna, que est luminare minus, non habet lucem nisi prout recipit a sole, sic nec regnum temporale auctoritatem habet nisi prout recipit a spirituali regimine. (3) They then go on to argue that, just as the moon, which is the lesser light, has no light except that which it receives from the sun, in the same way the temporal power has no authority except that which it receives from the spiritual power.
(4) Propter hanc et propter alias eorum rationes dissolvendas prenotandum quod, sicut Phylosopho placet in hiis que De sophisticis elenchis, solutio argumenti est erroris manifestatio. Et quia error potest esse in materia et in forma argumenti, dupliciter peccare contingit: aut scilicet assummendo falsum, aut non sillogizando; que duo Phylosophus obiciebat contra Parmenidem et Melissum dicens: «Quia falsa recipiunt et non sillogizantes sunt». Et accipio hic largo modo 'falsum' etiam pro 'inoppinabili', quod in materia probabili habet naturam falsi. (4) In order to refute this and other arguments of theirs, it must first be borne in mind that, as Aristotle states in the Sophistical Refutations, to refute an argument is to expose an error. And since an error may occur in the content and in the form of an argument, there are two ways in which an argument can be flawed: either because a false premiss has been adopted, or because the logic is faulty; both of these charges were made against Parmenides and Melissus by Aristotle when he said: "They adopt false premisses and use invalid syllogisms". And here I am taking "false" in a broad sense to include the unlikely, which is the equivalent of falsehood when the question is one of likelihood.
(5) Si vero in forma sit peccatum, conclusio interimenda est ab illo qui solvere vult, ostendendo formam sillogisticam non esse servatam. Si vero peccatum sit in materia, aut est quia 'simpliciter' falsum assumptum est, aut quia falsum 'secundum quid'. Si 'simpliciter', per interemptionem assumpti solvendum est; si 'secundum quid', per distinctionem. (5) If the error is a formal one, the conclusion has to be demolished by the person who wishes to refute it, by showing that it does not observe the rules of syllogistic argument. If on the other hand the error is one of content, it is because one of the premisses adopted is either false without qualification or else false in a certain respect. If it is false without qualification, then the argument is refuted by demolishing the premiss; if it is false in a certain respect, then it is refuted by drawing distinctions.
(6) Hoc viso, ad meliorem huius et aliarum inferius factarum solutionum evidentiam advertendum quod circa sensum misticum dupliciter errare contingit: aut querendo ipsum ubi non est, aut accipiendo aliter quam accipi debeat. (6) Once this has been grasped, then to reach a better understanding of the refutation of this point and those which follow, it must be borne in mind that one can make two kinds of error when dealing with the mystical sense: either looking for it where it does not exist, or taking it in some inadmissible way.
(7) Propter primum dicit Augustinus in Civitate Dei: «Non omnia que gesta narrantur etiam significare aliquid putanda sunt, sed propter illa que aliquid significant etiam ea que nichil significant actexuntur. Solo vomere terra proscinditur; sed ut hoc fieri possit, etiam cetera aratri membra sunt necessaria». (7) À propos of the first of these Augustine says in the De civitate Dei: "It must not be thought that every reported event has a further meaning; but those which have no further meaning are also included for the sake of those which do have such a meaning. Only the ploughshare breaks up the soil, but for this to happen the other parts of the plough are necessary as well".
(8) Propter secundum idem ait in Doctrina Cristiana, loquens de illo aliud in Scripturis sentire quam ille qui scripsit eas dicit, quod «ita fallitur ac si quisquam deserens viam eo tamen per girum pergeret quo via illa perducit»; et subdit: «Demonstrandum est ut consuetudine deviandi etiam in transversum aut perversum ire cogatur». (8) As regards the second the same writer says in the De doctrina christiana, speaking of detecting some other meaning in the scriptures than the man who wrote them, that "it is the same mistake as if one were to abandon the highway and yet proceed by a roundabout route to the same place the highway leads to"; and he adds: "It must be pointed out that the habit of going off the highway may force one to take cross-roads and wrong roads".
(9) Deinde innuit causam quare cavendum sit hoc in Scripturis, dicens: «Titubabit fides, si Divinarum Scripturarum vacillat autoritas». (9) And he goes on to indicate why this is to be avoided when dealing with the Scriptures, saying: "Faith will waver if the authority of the Holy Scriptures is shaken".
(10) Ego autem dico quod si talia fiunt de ignorantia, correctione diligenter adhibita ignoscendum est sicut ignoscendum esset illi qui leonem in nubibus formidaret; si vero industria, non aliter cum sic errantibus est agendum, quam cum tyrampnis, qui publica iura non ad comunem utilitatem secuntur, sed ad propriam retorquere conantur. (10) I therefore say that if such things are done out of ignorance, the mistake should be carefully pointed out and then excused, just as one would excuse someone who feared a lion in the clouds; but if such things are done deliberately, those who make this mistake should be treated no differently from tyrants who do not observe public rights for the common welfare, but seek to turn them to their own advantage.
(11) O summum facinus, etiamsi contingat in sompniis, ecterni Spiritus intentione abuti! Non enim peccatur in Moysen, non in David, non in Iob, non in Matheum, non in Paulum, sed in Spiritum Sanctum qui loquitur in illis. Nam quamquam scribe divini eloquii multi sint, unicus tamen dictator est Deus, qui beneplacitum suum nobis per multorum calamos explicare dignatus est. (11) O supreme wickedness, even if it should happen in dreams, to abuse the intention of the eternal Spirit! For this is not a sin against Moses, nor against David, nor Job, nor Matthew, nor Paul, but against the Holy Spirit who speaks through them. For although there are many who record the divine word, it is God alone who dictates, deigning to reveal his pleasure to us through the pens of many men.
(12) Hiis itaque prenotatis, ad id quod superius dicebatur dico per interemptionem illius dicti quo dicunt illa duo luminaria typice importare duo hec regimina: in quo quidem dicto tota vis argumenti consistit. (12) Having made these preliminary observations, with reference to the point made earlier I now proceed to refute that claim of theirs that those two lights allegorically signify these two kinds of power. The whole force of their argument lies in this claim.
(13) Quod autem ille sensus omnino sustineri non possit, duplici via potest ostendi. Primo quia, cum huiusmodi regimina sint accidentia quedam ipsius hominis, videretur Deus usus fuisse ordine perverso accidentia prius producendo quam proprium subiectum: quod absurdum est dicere de Deo; nam illa duo luminaria producta sunt die quarto et homo die sexto, ut patet in Lictera. (13) That this interpretation is completely untenable can be demonstrated in two ways. Firstly, given that these two kinds of power are accidental properties of man, God would seem to have perverted the natural order by producing accidents before their subject, which is an absurd claim to make about God; for those two lights were created on the fourth day and man on the sixth, as is clear from the Bible.
(14) Preterea, cum ista regimina sint hominum directiva in quosdam fines, ut infra patebit, si homo stetisset in statu innocentie in quo a Deo factus est, talibus directivis non indiguisset: sunt ergo huiusmodi regimina remedia contra infirmitatem peccati. (14) Further, given that those two powers guide men towards certain ends, as we shall see presently, if man had remained in the state of innocence in which he was created by God, he would have had no need of such guidance; such powers are thus remedies for the infirmity of sin.
(15) Cum ergo non solum in die quarto peccator homo non erat, sed etiam simpliciter homo non erat, producere remedia fuisset otiosum: quod est contra divinam bonitatem. Stultus enim esset medicus qui, ante nativitatem hominis, pro apostemate futuro illi emplastrum conficeret. (15) Therefore since on the fourth day man was not only not a sinner but he did not even exist, it would have been pointless to produce remedies; and this is against divine goodness. For it would be a foolish doctor who, before a man's birth, prepared a poultice for a future abscess.
(16) Non igitur dicendum est quod quarto die Deus hec duo regimina fecerit; et per consequens intentio Moysi esse non potuit illa quam fingunt. (16) It therefore cannot be maintained that on the fourth day God created these two powers; and consequently Moses' meaning cannot have been what they pretend.
(17) Potest etiam hoc, mendacio tollerando, per distinctionem dissolvi: mitior nanque est in adversarium solutio distinctiva; non enim omnino mentiens esse videtur, sicut interemptiva illum videri facit. Dico ergo quod licet luna non habeat lucem habundanter nisi ut a sole recipit, non propter hoc sequitur quod ipsa luna sit a sole. (17) This argument can also be refuted, if we tolerate the false premiss, by making a distinction; for a refutation based on a distinction is kinder to one''s adversary, in that he does not appear to be asserting an outright falsehood, as a refutation based on demolishing his premiss makes him appear to do. I therefore say that although the moon does not have light in abundance except in so far as it receives it from the sun, it does not follow from this that the moon derives from the sun.
(18) Unde sciendum quod aliud est esse ipsius lune, aliud virtus eius, et aliud operari. Quantum est ad esse, nullo modo luna dependet a sole, nec etiam quantum ad virtutem, nec quantum ad operationem simpliciter; quia motus eius est a motore proprio, influentia sua est a propriis eius radiis: habet enim aliquam lucem ex se, ut in eius eclipsi manifestum est. (18) For it must be grasped that the moon's existence is one thing, its power another, and its function another again. As far as its existence is concerned, the moon is in no way dependent on the sun; nor is it as far as its powers are concerned, nor in an absolute sense as far as its function is concerned; for its movement occurs by its own motion, and its influence comes from its own rays; it has some light of its own, as is apparent in its eclipse.
(19) Sed quantum ad melius et virtuosius operandum, recipit aliquid a sole, quia lucem habundantem: qua recepta, virtuosius operatur. (19) But as far as functioning better and more efficaciously is concerned, it receives something from the sun, namely abundant light; having received this, it operates more efficaciously.
(20) Sic ergo dico quod regnum temporale non recipit esse a spirituali, nec virtutem que est eius auctoritas, nec etiam operationem simpliciter; sed bene ab eo recipit ut virtuosius operetur per lucem gratie quam in celo et in terra benedictio summi Pontificis infundit illi. (20) Thus I say that the temporal realm does not owe its existence to the spiritual realm, nor its power (which is its authority), and not even its function in an absolute sense; but it does receive from it the capacity to operate more efficaciously through the light of grace which in heaven and on earth the blessing of the supreme Pontiff infuses into it.
(21) Et ideo argumentum peccabat in forma, quia predicatum in conclusione non est extremitas maioris, ut patet; procedit enim sic: luna recipit lucem a sole qui est regimen spirituale; regimen temporale est luna; ergo regimen temporale recipit auctoritatem a regimine spirituali. (21) And thus the argument contained a formal error, for the predicate in the conclusion was not the same as the predicate of the major premiss, as is obvious; for it runs like this: the moon receives its light from the sun, which is the spiritual power; the temporal power is the moon; therefore the temporal power receives its authority from the spiritual power.
(22) Nam in extremitate maioris ponunt 'lucem', in predicato vero conclusionis 'auctoritatem': que sunt res diverse subiecto et ratione, ut visum est. (22) For in the predicate of the major premiss they put "light", whereas in the predicate of the conclusion they put "authority", and these are two different things in respect of their subject and their meaning, as we have seen.