Monarchia (III, ii, 1-7)

(1) Ad presentem questionem discutiendam, sicut in superioribus est peractum, aliquod principium est assummendum in virtute cuius aperiende veritatis argumenta formentur; nam sine prefixo principio etiam vera dicendo laborare quid prodest, cum principium solum assummendorum mediorum sit radix. (1) In order to investigate this question, some principle must be adopted (just as it was with the previous ones) on whose validity the arguments designed to reveal the truth can be based; for without an agreed principle what point is there in striving, even though one speaks the truth, since only such a principle provides a basis for the middle terms to be adopted?
(2) Hec igitur irrefragabilis veritas prefigatur: scilicet quod illud quod nature intentioni repugnat Deus nolit. Nam si hoc verum non esset, contradictorium eius non esset falsum, quod est: Deum non nolle quod nature intentioni repugnat. (2) So let this inviolable truth be formulated at the outset: what is contrary to nature's intention is against God's will. For if this were not true, its contradictory would not be false, i.e. what is contrary to nature's intention is not against God's will.
(3) Et si hoc non falsum, nec ea que secuntur ad ipsum; inpossibile enim est in necessariis consequentiis falsum esse consequens antecedente non falso existente. (3) And if this is not false, nor are those things which follow from it; for it is impossible in necessary consequences for the consequent to be false without the antecedent being false.
(4) Sed ad non nolle alterum duorum sequitur de necessitate: aut velle aut non velle; sicut ad non odire necessario sequitur aut amare aut non amare; non enim non amare est odire, nec non velle est nolle, ut de se patet. Que si falsa non sunt, ista non erit falsa: 'Deus vult quod non vult'; cuius falsitas non habet superiorem. (4) But one of two things must necessarily follow if a thing is not against one's will: one must either will it or not will it; just as, if one does not hate something, it necessarily follows that one either loves it or does not love it; for not loving is not the same as hating, and the fact that one does not will something is not the same as its being against one's will, as is self-evident. If these conclusions are not false, this will not be false either: "God wills what he does not will"; and nothing could be more false than this.
(5) Quod autem verum sit quod dicitur sic declaro: manifestum est quod Deus finem nature vult, aliter celum otiose moveret; quod dicendum non est. Si Deus vellet impedimentum finis, vellet etiam finem impedimenti, aliter etiam otiose vellet; et cum finis impedimenti sit non esse rei impedite, sequeretur Deum velle non esse finem nature, quem dicitur velle esse. (5) I prove the truth of this affirmation as follows: it is obvious that God wills the goal of nature, otherwise he would move the heavens to no purpose - not a tenable proposition. If God willed the obstructing of nature's goal, he would also will the goal of that obstructing, for otherwise he would once again will to no effect; and since the aim of an obstruction is to prevent what is obstructed from happening, it would follow that God willed that nature should not fulfil its goal - which he is said to will.
(6) Si enim Deus non vellet impedimentum finis, prout non vellet sequeretur ad non velle nichil de impedimento curare, sive esset sive non esset; sed qui impedimentum non curat, rem que potest impediri non curat, et per consequens non habet in voluntate; et quod quis non habet in voluntate, non vult. (6) But if God did not will the obstructing of nature's goal, inasmuch as he did not will it, it would follow logically from his not willing that he was indifferent to whether the obstructing took place or did not take place; but one who is indifferent to an obstruction is indifferent to the thing which can be obstructed, and therefore does not have it in his will; and what someone does not have in his will, he does not will.
(7) Propter quod si finis nature impediri potest -- quod potest -- de necessitate sequitur quod Deus finem nature non vult; et sic sequitur quod prius: videlicet Deum velle quod non vult. Verissimum igitur est illud principium ex cuius contradictorio tam absurda secuntur. (7) Therefore if the goal of nature can be obstructed - which it can - it necessarily follows that God does not will the goal of nature; and thus our earlier conclusion follows, namely that God wills what he does not will. That principle from whose contradictory such absurd consequences follow is therefore unquestionably true.