Monarchia (II, vii, 1-13)

(1) Ad bene quoque venandum veritatem quesiti scire oportet quod divinum iudicium in rebus quandoque hominibus est manifestum, quandoque occultum. (1) In order to get a secure grasp of the truth of our question it must moreover be borne in mind that divine judgment in earthly affairs is sometimes revealed to men, and sometimes it remains hidden.
(2) Et manifestum potest esse dupliciter: ratione scilicet et fide. Nam quedam iudicia Dei sunt ad que humana ratio propriis pedibus pertingere potest, sicut ad hoc: quod homo pro salute patrie seipsum exponat; nam si pars debet se exponere pro salute totius, cum homo sit pars quedam civitatis, ut per Phylosophum patet in suis Politicis, homo pro patria debet exponere seipsum, tanquam minus bonum pro meliori. (2) Now there are two ways in which it can be revealed, i.e. by reason and by faith. For there are some judgments of God which human reason can arrive at by its own unaided efforts, such as this: that a man should sacrifice himself to save his country; for if the part should put itself at risk for the sake of the whole, then since man is a part of his community, as Aristotle says in the Politics, then a man should sacrifice himself for his country, as a lesser good for a greater.
(3) Unde Phylosophus ad Nicomacum: «Amabile quidem enim et uni soli, melius et divinius vero genti et civitati». Et hoc iudicium Dei est; aliter humana ratio in sua rectitudine non sequeretur nature intentionem: quod est inpossibile. (3) And so Aristotle says in the Ethics: "Though it is worthwhile to attain the good merely for one man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for a people or a community". And this is God's judgment; otherwise human reason in its right judgment would not be in harmony with nature's intention, which is impossible.
(4) Quedam etiam iudicia Dei sunt, ad que etsi humana ratio ex propriis pertingere nequit, elevatur tamen ad illa cum adiutorio fidei eorum que in Sacris Licteris nobis dicta sunt, sicut ad hoc: quod nemo, quantumcunque moralibus et intellectualibus virtutibus et secundum habitum et secundum operationem perfectus, absque fide salvari potest, dato quod nunquam aliquid de Cristo audiverit. (4) Then there are some judgments of God to which human reason, even if it cannot arrive at them by its own unaided efforts, can nonetheless be raised with the help of faith in those things which are said to us in the Scriptures; such as this: that no one can be saved without faith (assuming that he has never heard anything of Christ), no matter how perfectly endowed he might be in the moral and intellectual virtues in respect both of his character and his behaviour.
(5) Nam hoc ratio humana per se iustum intueri non potest, fide tamen adiuta potest. Scriptum est enim ad Hebreos: «Inpossibile est sine fide placere Deo»; et in Levitico: «Homo quilibet de domo Israel, qui occiderit bovem aut ovem aut capram in castris vel extra castra et non obtulerit ad hostium tabernaculi oblationem Domino, sanguinis reus erit». (5) For human reason cannot see this to be just by its own powers, but with the aid of faith it can. For it is written to the Hebrews: "It is impossible to please God without faith"; and in Leviticus: "Any man of the house of Israel who shall kill an ox or lamb or goat in the camp or outside the camp, and shall not bring it to the door of the tabernacle as an offering to the Lord, shall be guilty of blood".
(6) Hostium tabernaculi Cristum figurat, qui est hostium conclavis ecterni, ut ex evangelio elici potest: occisio animalium operationes humanas. (6) The door of the tabernacle is a figure of Christ, who is the doorway to the eternal assembly, as can be gathered from the Gospel; the killing of animals symbolises human actions.
(7) Occultum vero est iudicium Dei ad quod humana ratio nec lege nature nec lege Scripture, sed de gratia speciali quandoque pertingit; quod fit pluribus modis: quandoque simplici revelatione, quandoque revelatione disceptatione quadam mediante. (7) But that judgment of God is hidden which human reason arrives at neither through the law of nature, nor the law of the scriptures, but occasionally by special grace. This can happen in several ways, sometimes by direct revelation, and sometimes being revealed through some kind of putting-to-the-test.
(8) Simplici revelatione dupliciter: aut sponte Dei, aut oratione impetrante; sponte Dei dupliciter: aut expresse, aut per signum; expresse, sicut revelatum fuit iudicium Samueli contra Saulem; per signum, sicut Pharaoni revelatum fuit per signa quod Deus iudicaverat de liberatione filiorum Israel. Oratione impetrante, quod sciebant qui dicebant secundo Paralipomenon: «Cum ignoramus quid agere debeamus, hoc solum habemus residui: quod oculos nostros ad Te dirigamus». (8) There are two ways in which it can happen by direct revelation: either by a spontaneous act of God, or by God in response to prayer. By a spontaneous act of God there are two ways: either openly or through a sign; openly, as when the judgment against Saul was revealed to Samuel; by a sign, as when what God willed regarding the liberation of the children of Israel was revealed to Pharoah through a sign. It can be a response to prayer, as they knew who said in the second book of Chronicles: "When we do not know what we should do, this course alone is left us: that we should turn our eyes to Thee."
(9) Disceptatione vero mediante dupliciter: aut sorte, aut certamine; 'certare' etenim ab eo quod est 'certum facere' dictum est. Sorte quidem Dei iudicium quandoque revelatur hominibus, ut patet in substitutione Mathie in Actibus Apostolorum. Certamine vero dupliciter Dei iudicium aperitur: vel ex collisione virium, sicut fit per duellum pugilum, qui duelliones etiam vocantur, vel ex contentione plurium ad aliquod signum prevalere conantium, sicut fit per pugnam athletarum currentium ad bravium. (9) There are two ways in which it can be revealed through a putting-to-the-test: either by lot or through a contest; for the word "certare" ("to decide something by a contest") derives from "certum facere" ("to make certain"). God's judgment is sometimes revealed to men by lot, as in the substitution of Matthias in the Acts of the Apostles. God's judgment can be revealed by a contest in two ways: either by a clash of strength, as happens in combat between two champions, who are called prize-fighters, or through competition among a number of people who vie with one another to reach an agreed goal, as happens in a race between athletes competing to reach the finishing-line first.
(10) Primus horum modorum apud Gentiles figuratus fuit in illo duello Herculis et Anthei, cuius Lucanus meminit in quarto Farsalie Ovidius in nono De rerum transmutatione; secundus figuratur apud eosdem in Athalanta et Ypomene in decimo De rerum transmutatione. (10) The first of these ways was prefigured among the pagans in that famous fight between Hercules and Antaeus, which Lucan recalls in the fourth book of the Pharsalia and Ovid in the ninth book of the Metamorphoses; the second was prefigured among those same pagans by the race between Atalanta and Hippomene in the tenth book of the Metamorphoses.
(11) Similiter et latere non debet quoniam in his duobus decertandi generibus ita se habet res, ut in altero sine iniuria decertantes impedire se possint, puta duelliones, in altero vero non; non enim athlete impedimento in alterutrum uti debent, quamvis Poeta noster aliter sensisse videtur in quinto, cum fecit remunerari Eurialum. (11) Nor should we overlook the fact that in these two kinds of contest different rules apply: in the first the contestants can obstruct each other quite legitimately (for instance prize-fighters), whereas in the second this is not allowed; for runners must not obstruct one another - although our poet seems to have thought differently in his fifth book, when he had Eurialus win the prize.
(12) Propter quod melius Tullius in tertiis Offitiis hoc prohibuit sententiam Crisippi sequens; ait enim sic: «Scite Crisippus, ut multa: 'qui stadium' inquit 'currit, eniti et contendere debet quam maxime possit ut vincat; supplantare eum, quicum certet nullo modo debet'». (12) So that Cicero did better to forbid this, in the third book of the De officiis, following the opinion of Chrysippus; for he says as follows: "With his customary aptness Chrysippus says: 'When a man races in the arena he must exert himself and strive his hardest to win; he must not in any way obstruct his fellow-competitor'".
(13) Hiis itaque in capitulo distinctis, duas rationes efficaces ad propositum accipere possumus: scilicet a disceptatione athletarum unam, et a disceptatione pugilum alteram; quas quidem prosequar in sequentibus et inmediatis capitulis. (13) Having made these distinctions in this chapter, we can take two lines of argument which serve our purpose: one from the competition between runners, the other from the contest between prize-fighters. I shall develop these arguments in the chapters which now directly follow.