Monarchia (II, v, 1-26)

(1) Quicunque preterea bonum rei publice intendit, finem iuris intendit. Quodque ita sequatur sic ostenditur: ius est realis et personalis hominis ad hominem proportio, que servata hominum servat sotietatem, et corrupta corrumpit -- nam illa Digestorum descriptio non dicit quod quid est iuris, sed describit illud per notitiam utendi illo --; (1) Moreover, whoever has the good of the community as his goal has the achievement of right as his goal. That the one necessarily follows from the other can be shown in this way: right is a relationship between one individual and another in respect of things and people; when it is respected it preserves human society and when it is violated it destroys it. For the description of it given in the Digests does not say what right is, but describes it in terms of its practical application.
(2) si ergo definitio ista bene 'quid est' et 'quare' comprehendit, et cuiuslibet sotietatis finis est comune sotiorum bonum, necesse est finem cuiusque iuris bonum comune esse; et inpossibile est ius esse, bonum comune non intendens. Propter quod bene Tullius in Prima rethorica: semper -- inquit -- ad utilitatem rei publice leges interpretande sunt. (2) If therefore our definition correctly embraces both the essence and the purpose of right, and if the goal of any society is the common good of its members, it necessarily follows that the purpose of every right is the common good; and it is impossible that there can be a right which does not aim at the common good. Hence Cicero is correct when he says in the De inventione that laws are always to be interpreted for the benefit of the community.
(3) Quod si ad utilitatem eorum qui sunt sub lege leges directe non sunt, leges nomine solo sunt, re autem leges esse non possunt: leges enim oportet homines devincire ad invicem propter comunem utilitatem. Propter quod bene Seneca de lege cum in libro De quatuor virtutibus, «legem vinculum» dicat «humane sotietatis». (3) For if laws are not framed for the benefit of those who are subject to the law, they are laws in name only, but in reality they cannot be laws; for laws must bind men together for their mutual benefit. For this reason Seneca speaks appositely of the law when he says in De quatuor virtutibus that "law is the bond of human society".
(4) Patet igitur quod quicunque bonum rei publice intendit finem iuris intendit. Si ergo Romani bonum rei publice intenderunt, verum erit dicere finem iuris intendisse. (4) Thus it is clear that whoever has the good of the community as his goal has the achievement of right as his goal. Therefore if the Romans had the good of the community as their goal, it will be true to say that the achievement of right was their goal.
(5) Quod autem romanus populus bonum prefatum intenderit subiciendo sibi orbem terrarum, gesta sua declarant, in quibus, omni cupiditate summota, que rei publice semper adversa est, et universali pace cum libertate dilecta, populus ille sanctus pius et gloriosus propria commoda neglexisse videtur, ut publica pro salute humani generis procuraret. Unde recte illud scriptum est: «Romanum imperium de Fonte nascitur pietatis». (5) That the Roman people in conquering the world did have the good of which we have spoken as their goal is shown by their deeds, for, having repressed all greed (which is always harmful to the community) and cherishing universal peace and freedom, that holy, dutiful and glorious people can be seen to have disregarded personal advantage in order to promote the public interest for the benefit of mankind. Thus with good reason it was written: "The Roman empire is born of the fountain-head of piety".
(6) Sed quia de intentione omnium ex electione agentium nichil manifestum est extra intendentem nisi per signa exteriora, et sermones inquirendi sunt secundum subiectam materiam -- ut iam dictum est -- satis in hoc loco habebimus, si de intentione populi romani signa indubitabilia tam in collegiis quam in singularibus personis ostendantur. (6) But since it is only through external signs that anything about the intentions of all free agents is revealed to the outside world, and since our arguments must be sought in accordance with our subject matter, as we have already said, it will suffice for our purposes if we discover indubitable signs revealing the intention of the Roman people both in its collegiate bodies and in individual citizens.
(7) De collegiis quidem, quibus homines ad rem publicam quodammodo religati esse videntur, sufficit illa sola Ciceronis autoritas in secundis Offitiis: «Quandiu» inquit «imperium rei publice beneficiis tenebatur, non iniuriis, bella aut pro sotiis aut de imperio gerebantur, exitus erant bellorum aut mites aut necessarii; regum, populorum et nationum portus erat et refugium senatus; nostri autem et magistratus imperatoresque in ea re maxime laudem capere studuerunt, si provincias, si sotios equitate et fide defendissent. Itaque illud 'patrocinium' orbis terrarum potius quam 'imperium' poterat nominari». Hec Cicero. (7) As for its collegiate bodies, which seem in some sense to function as a bond between individuals and the community, the sole authority of Cicero in the De officiis is sufficient: "So long as the power of the state was exercised through acts of service and not of oppression, wars were waged either on behalf of our allies or to safeguard our supremacy, and the consequences of wars were mild or else unavoidable; the senate was a haven and a refuge for kings, peoples and nations; both our magistrates and our military chiefs strove to win praise for this above all, for defending the provinces and our allies justly and loyally. Thus 'protection' of the world might be a more appropriate term than 'domination'." These are Cicero's words.
(8) De personis autem singularibus compendiose progrediar. Nunquid non bonum comune intendisse dicendi sunt qui sudore, qui paupertate, qui exilio, qui filiorum orbatione, qui amissione membrorum, qui denique animarum oblatione bonum publicum exaugere conati sunt? (8) As for individuals, I shall proceed with brief sketches. Are they not to be described as having aimed at the common good who strove to increase the public good with toil, with poverty, with exile, with the loss of their children, the loss of their limbs, even the loss of their lives?
(9) Nonne Cincinnatus ille sanctum nobis reliquit exemplum libere deponendi dignitatem in termino cum, assumptus ab aratro, dictator factus est, ut Livius refert, et post victoriam, post triumphum, sceptro imperatorio restituto consulibus, sudaturus post boves ad stivam libere reversus est? (9) Did not the great Cincinnatus leave us a holy example of freely relinquishing his high office when his term came to an end? Taken from his plough to become dictator, as Livy relates, after his victory and his triumph he handed back the sceptre of office to the consuls and went back of his own free will to toil at the plough-handle behind his oxen.
(10) Quippe in eius laudem Cicero, contra Epycurum in hiis que De fine bonorum disceptans huius beneficii memor fuit: «Itaque» inquit «et maiores nostri ab aratro duxerunt Cincinnatum illum, ut dictator esset». (10) Cicero indeed, arguing against Epicurus in the De fine bonorum, recalls this act of public service approvingly: "And thus our ancestors led the great Cincinnatus from the plough to make him dictator".
(11) Nonne Fabritius altum nobis dedit exemplum avaritie resistendi cum, pauper existens, pro fide qua rei publice tenebatur auri grande pondus oblatum derisit, ac derisum, verba sibi convenientia fundens, despexit et refutavit? Huius etiam memoriam confirmavit Poeta noster in sexto cum caneret:
parvoque potentem Fabritium.
(11) Did not Fabritius give us a lofty example of resisting avarice when, poor as he was, out of loyalty to the republic he scorned the great sum of gold which was offered him - scorned it and spurned it with disdain, uttering words in keeping with his character? The memory of this incident too is confirmed by our poet in his sixth book when he said: "Fabritius, a great man in his poverty".
(12) Nunquid non preferendi leges propriis commodis memorabile nobis exemplar Camillus fuit qui, secundum Livium, dampnatus exilio, postquam patriam liberavit obsessam, spolia etiam romana Rome restituit, universo populo reclamante, ab urbe sancta discessit, nec ante reversus est quam sibi repatriandi licentia de auctoritate senatus allata est? Et hunc magnanimum Poeta commendat in sexto cum dicit:
referentem signa Camillum.
(12) Did not Camillus give us a memorable example of putting the law before personal advantage? Condemned to exile, according to Livy, after he had freed his besieged country and returned the Roman spoils to Rome, he left the holy city although the whole populace clamoured against his going, and he did not return until permission to come back to Rome was brought to him by authority of the senate. And our poet commends this great spirit in his sixth book when he says: "Camillus bringing back the standards".
(13) Nonne filios an non omnes alios postponendos patrie libertati Brutus ille primus edocuit, quem Livius dicit, consulem existentem, proprios filios cum hostibus conspirantes morti dedisse? Cuius gloria renovatur in sexto Poete nostri de ipso canentis:
natosque pater nova bella moventes ad penam pulcra pro libertate vocavit.
(13) Did not the first Brutus teach us that not just all other people but our own children must take second place to freedom of the fatherland? Livy says that when he was consul he condemned his own sons to death for conspiring with the enemy. His glory lives on in our poet's sixth book when he says of him: "In fair freedom's name The father condemned to death his own two sons Plotting new wars".
(14) Quid non audendum pro patria nobis Mutius persuasit cum incautum Porsennam invasit, cum deinde manum errantem, non alio vultu quam si hostem cruciari videret, suam adhuc, cremari aspiciebat? Quod etiam Livius admiratur testificando. (14) What did Mutius not teach us to dare for the fatherland when he attacked Porsenna, who was off his guard, and then watched his own hand which had missed its mark burn in the fire with the same expression on his face as if he saw an enemy being tortured? Even Livy expresses amazement as he reports this incident.
(15) Accedunt nunc ille sacratissime victime Deciorum, qui pro salute publica devotas animas posuerunt, ut Livius, non quantum est dignum, sed quantum potest glorificando renarrat; accedit et illud inenarrabile sacrifitium severissimi vere libertatis tutoris Marci Catonis. Quorum alteri pro salute patrie mortis tenebras non horruerunt; alter, ut mundo libertatis amores accenderet, quanti libertas esset ostendit dum e vita liber decedere maluit quam sine libertate manere in illa. (15) Now add to their number those most holy victims, the Decii, who laid down their lives dedicated to the salvation of the community, as Livy relates to their glory, not in terms worthy of them but as best he can; and that sacrifice (words cannot express it) of the most stern guardian of liberty, Marcus Cato. The former for the deliverance of their fatherland did not recoil from the shadows of death; the latter, in order to set the world afire with love of freedom, showed the value of freedom when he preferred to die a free man rather than remain alive without freedom.
(16) Horum omnium nomen egregium voce Tullii recalescit. In hiis que De fine bonorum inquit enim Tullius hoc de Deciis: «Publius Decius princeps in ea familia consul, cum se devoveret, et equo admisso in mediam aciem Latinorum irruebat, aliquid de voluptatibus suis cogitabat, ubi ut eam caperet aut quando, cum sciret confestim esse moriendum, eamque mortem ardentiori studio peteret quam Epycurus voluptatem petendam putat? Quod quidem eius factum, nisi esset iure laudatum, non esset ymitatus quarto consulatu suo filius, neque porro ex eo natus, cum Pyrro bellum gerens, consul eo cecidisset in prelio seque e continenti genere tertiam victimam rei publice tribuisset». (16) The great renown of all these men lives on in the words of Cicero. For Cicero says this of the Decii in the De fine bonorum: "When Publius Decius, first in that family to be consul, offered himself up and charged on his horse at full speed into the thick of the Latin ranks, surely he had no thought of personal pleasure, or where or when he might seize it; for he knew that he was about to die, and sought out death with more passionate eagerness than Epicurus thinks we should devote to seeking pleasure. But had this action of his not been praised with good reason, his son would not have imitated it in his fourth consulship; nor would his son's son in his turn, when he was consul in the war against Pyrrhus, have fallen in battle and offered himself to the state as the third victim from succeeding generations of the same family".
(17) In hiis vero que De offitiis, de Catone dicebat: «Non enim alia in causa Marcus Cato fuit, alia ceteri qui se in Affrica Cesari tradiderunt. Atque ceteris forsan vitio datum esset si se interemissent, propterea quod levior eorum vita et mores fuerunt faciliores; Catoni vero cum incredibilem natura tribuisset gravitatem, eamque perpetua constantia roborasset, semperque in proposito susceptoque consilio permansisset, moriendum ei potius quam tyrampni vultus aspiciendus fuit». (17) In the De officiis he says of Cato: "For the situation of Marcus Cato was no different from that of the others who surrendered to Caesar in Africa. Yet if the others had killed themselves it would perhaps have been accounted a fault in them, because their lives were less austere and their habits more relaxed; but since nature had bestowed on Cato an austerity beyond belief, and he had strengthened it with unfailing constancy, and had always persisted in any resolve or plan he had undertaken, it was fitting that he should die rather than set eyes on the face of the tyrant".
(18) Declarata igitur duo sunt; quorum unum est, quod quicunque bonum rei publice intendit finem iuris intendit: aliud est, quod romanus populus subiciendo sibi orbem bonum publicum intendit. (18) Thus two things have been explained; the first is that whoever has the good of the community as his goal has the achievement of right as his goal; the other is that the Roman people in conquering the world had the public good as their goal.
(19) Nunc arguatur ad propositum sic: quicunque finem iuris intendit cum iure graditur; romanus populus subiciendo sibi orbem finem iuris intendit, ut manifeste per superiora in isto capitulo est probatum: ergo romanus populus subiciendo sibi orbem cum iure hoc fecit, et per consequens de iure sibi ascivit Imperii dignitatem. (19) Now it may be argued for our purposes as follows: whoever has right as his goal proceeds with right; the Roman people subjecting the world to its rule had right as its goal, as has been clearly demonstrated by what has been said already in this chapter; therefore the Roman people subjecting the world to its rule did this in accordance with right, and as a consequence took upon itself the dignity of empire by right.
(20) Que conclusio ut ex omnibus manifestis illata sit, manifestandum est hoc quod dicitur: quod quicunque finem iuris intendit cum iure graditur. Ad cuius evidentiam advertendum quod quelibet res est propter aliquem finem; aliter esset otiosa, quod esse non potest, ut superius dicebatur. (20) For this conclusion to be inferred from premisses which are all clear, the following statement must be clarified: that whoever has right as his goal proceeds with right. To clarify this it must be borne in mind that each and every thing exists for some purpose; otherwise it would be useless, which is not possible, as we said earlier.
(21) Et quemadmodum omnis res est ad proprium finem, sic omnis finis propriam habet rem cuius est finis; unde inpossibile est aliqua duo per se loquendo, in quantum duo, finem eundem intendere: sequeretur enim idem inconveniens, quod alterum scilicet esset frustra. (21) And in the same way that each thing exists for its own particular purpose, so too each purpose has some thing of which it is the purpose; and so it is impossible strictly speaking for any two things, in so far as they are two, to have the same purpose; for the same inadmissible conclusion would follow, i.e. that one of them would exist in vain.
(22) Cum ergo iuris finis quidam sit -- ut iam declaratum est -- necesse est fine illo posito ius poni, cum sit proprius et per se iuris effectus. Et cum in omni consequentia inpossibile sit habere antecedens absque consequente, ut hominem sine animali, sicut patet construendo et destruendo, inpossibile est iuris finem querere sine iure, cum quelibet res ad proprium finem se habeat velut consequens ad antecedens: nam inpossibile est bonam valetudinem membrorum actingere sine sanitate. (22) Now since there exists a purpose of right - as we have already explained - then having postulated the purpose it becomes necessary to postulate right, since the purpose is an intrinsic and necessary effect of right. And since in any relationship of consequentiality it is impossible to have the antecedent without the consequent, as for example one cannot have "man" without "animal" - as is clear if one affirms the first while denying the second - it is impossible to seek the purpose of right without right, since each and every thing is related to its own particular purpose as consequent is to antecedent; e.g. it is impossible to have a healthy condition of the limbs without having good health.
(23) Propter quod evidentissime patet quod finem iuris intendentem oportet cum iure intendere; nec valet instantia que de verbis Phylosophi 'eubuliam' pertractantis elici solet. Dicit enim Phylosophus: «Sed et hoc falso sillogismo sortiri: quod quidem oportet sortiri; per quod autem non, sed falsum medium terminum esse». (23) From this it is quite apparent that one who seeks the purpose of right must seek it with right; nor is this invalidated by the objection which is customarily based on Aristotle's words where he discusses "eubulia". For Aristotle says: "Yet it is possible to attain even good by a false syllogism: to attain what one ought, but not by the right means, the middle term being false".
(24) Nam si ex falsis verum quodammodo concluditur, hoc est per accidens, in quantum illud verum importatur per voces illationis; per se enim verum nunquam sequitur ex falsis, signa tamen veri bene secuntur ex signis que sunt signa falsi. (24) For if a true conclusion is in some way arrived at from false premisses, this happens by accident, inasmuch as the truth is introduced in the words of the conclusion; for in itself truth never follows from false premisses, but words expressing truth may well follow from words which express falsehood.
(25) Sic et in operabilibus: nam licet fur de furto subveniat pauperi, non tamen elimosina dicenda est, sed est actio quedam que, si de propria substantia fieret, elimosine formam haberet. (25) And the same is true in actions; for although the thief may help the poor man with the proceeds of his thieving, nonetheless we cannot call this alms-giving, although it is an action which would be alms-giving if it were done with his own property.
(26) Similiter est de fine iuris: quia si aliquid, ut finis ipsius iuris, absque iure obtineretur, ita esset finis iuris, hoc est comune bonum, sicut exhibitio facta de male acquisito est elimosina; et sic, cum in propositione dicatur de fine iuris existente, non tantum apparente, instantia nulla est. Patet igitur quod querebatur. (26) The same is true of the purpose of right, because if anything were to be obtained as the purpose of this right but without right, that thing would be the purpose of right (i.e. the common good) in the same way as the giving of stolen goods is alms-giving; and so, since in our proposition we are speaking of the purpose of right as it really is, not just as it appears to be, the objection has no force. The point we were inquiring into is thus quite clear.