Monarchia (II, ii, 1-8)

(1) Postquam sufficienter, secundum quod materia patitur, de veritate prime dubitationis inquisitum est, instat nunc de veritate secunde inquirere: hoc est utrum romanus populus de iure sibi asciverit Imperii dignitatem; cuius quidem inquisitionis principium est videre que sit illa veritas, in quam rationes inquisitionis presentis velut in principium proprium reducantur. (1) Having sufficiently investigated the truth concerning the first question, within those limits the subject itself allows, we must now investigate the truth in relation to the second: that is, did the Roman people take on the dignity of empire by right? The starting-point of this investigation is to see what that truth is to which the arguments in this investigation can be referred back as to their own first principle.
(2) Sciendum est igitur quod, quemadmodum ars in triplici gradu invenitur, in mente scilicet artificis, in organo et in materia formata per artem; sic et naturam in triplici gradu possumus intueri. Est enim natura in mente primi motoris, qui Deus est; deinde in celo, tanquam in organo quo mediante similitudo bonitatis ecterne in fluitantem materiam explicatur. (2) We must bear in mind then that, just as art is found at three levels, in the mind of the craftsman, in his instrument, and in the material shaped by his craft, so too we can consider nature at three levels. For nature is in the mind of the first mover, who is God; then in the heavens, as in the instrument by means of which the image of eternal goodness is set forth in fluctuating matter.
(3) Et quemadmodum, perfecto existente artifice atque optime organo se habente, si contingat peccatum in forma artis, materie tantum imputandum est, sic, cum Deus ultimum perfectionis actingat et instrumentum eius, quod celum est, nullum debite perfectionis patiatur defectum, ut ex hiis patet que de celo phylosophamur, restat quod quicquid in rebus inferioribus est peccatum, ex parte materie subiacentis peccatum sit et preter intentionem Dei naturantis et celi; et quod quicquid est in rebus inferioribus bonum, cum ab ipsa materia esse non possit, sola potentia existente, per prius ab artifice Deo sit et secundario a celo, quod organum est artis divine, quam 'naturam' comuniter appellant. (3) And just as, when the craftsman is perfect and his instrument is in excellent order, if a flaw occurs in the work of art it is to be imputed exclusively to the material; in the same way, since God attains the highest perfection and his instrument (i.e. the heavens) cannot fall short of the perfection appropriate to it (as is clear from those things philosophy teaches us about the heavens), our conclusion is this: whatever flaws there are in earthly things are flaws due to the material of which they are constituted, and are no part of the intention of God the creator and the heavens; and whatever good there is in earthly things, since it cannot come from the material (which exists only as a potentiality), comes primarily from God the maker and secondarily from the heavens, which are the instrument of Gods handiwork, which is commonly called nature.
(4) Ex hiis iam liquet quod ius, cum sit bonum, per prius in mente Dei est; et, cum omne quod in mente Dei est sit Deus, iuxta illud «Quod factum est in ipso vita erat», et Deus maxime se ipsum velit, sequitur quod ius a Deo, prout in eo est, sit volitum. Et cum voluntas et volitum in Deo sit idem, sequitur ulterius quod divina voluntas sit ipsum ius. (4) From what has been said it is now clear that right, being a good, exists firstly in the mind of God; and since everything which is in the mind of God is God (in conformity with that saying "Whatever was made was life in him"), and since God principally wills himself, it follows that right is willed by God as being something which is in him. And since in God will and what is willed are one and the same thing, it further follows that divine will is right itself.
(5) Et iterum ex hoc sequitur quod ius in rebus nichil est aliud quam similitudo divine voluntatis; unde fit quod quicquid divine voluntati non consonat, ipsum ius esse non possit, et quicquid divine voluntati est consonum, ius ipsum sit. (5) And again it follows from this that in the created world right is simply the image of divine will; and thus it follows that whatever is not in harmony with divine will cannot be right, and whatever is in harmony with divine will is by that very fact right.
(6) Quapropter querere utrum de iure factum sit aliquid, licet alia verba sint, nichil tamen aliud queritur quam utrum factum sit secundum quod Deus vult. Hoc ergo supponatur, quod illud quod Deus in hominum sotietate vult, illud pro vero atque sincero iure habendum sit. (6) And so to ask whether something happened by right, even though the words are different, is the same thing as asking whether it happened in accordance with God's will. Let us therefore formulate this principle: that what God wills in human society must be considered true and pure right.
(7) Preterea meminisse oportet quod, ut Phylosophus docet in primis ad Nicomacum, non similiter in omni materia certitudo querenda est, sed secundum quod natura rei subiecte recipit. Propter quod sufficienter argumenta sub invento principio procedent, si ex manifestis signis atque sapientum autoritatibus ius illius populi gloriosi queratur. (7) Besides it must be remembered that, as Aristotle teaches at the beginning of the Ethics, certainty is not to be sought in the same way in every subject, but according as the nature of the subject-matter allows. Therefore our arguments will be derived with sufficient rigour from the principle we have formulated, if we seek proof of the right of that glorious people in clear signs and the authoritative statements of wise men.
(8) Voluntas quidem Dei per se invisibilis est; et invisibilia Dei «per ea que facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur»; nam, occulto existente sigillo, cera impressa de illo quamvis occulto tradit notitiam manifestam. Nec mirum, si divina voluntas per signa querenda est; cum etiam humana extra volentem non aliter quam per signa cernatur. (8) For the will of God in itself is indeed invisible; but the invisible things of God "are clearly perceived by being understood through the things he has made"; for although the seal is hidden, the wax stamped by the seal (hidden though it is) yields clear knowledge of it. Nor is it a cause for amazement if God's will is to be sought through signs, since even the will of a human being is discernible to the outside world only through signs.