Monarchia (I, xv, 1-10)

(1) Item dico quod ens et unum et bonum gradatim se habent secundum quintum modum dicendi 'prius'. Ens enim natura precedit unum, unum vero bonum: maxime enim ens maxime est unum, et maxime unum maxime bonum; et quanto aliquid a maxime ente elongatur, tanto et ab esse unum et per consequens ab esse bonum. (1) Again, I say that being, unity and goodness are related in a sequence, according to the fifth sense of the term "priority". Being naturally comes before unity, and unity before goodness: perfect being is perfect unity, and perfect unity is perfect goodness; and the further removed something is from perfect being, the further it is from being one and consequently from being good.
(2) Propter quod in omni genere rerum illud est optimum quod est maxime unum, ut Phylosopho placet in hiis que De simpliciter ente. Unde fit quod unum esse videtur esse radix eius quod est esse bonum, et multa esse eius quod est esse malum; qua re Pictagoras in correlationibus suis ex parte boni ponebat unum, ex parte vero mali plurale, ut patet in primo eorum que De simpliciter ente. (2) Therefore in every species of thing the best is that which is perfectly one, as Aristotle says in the Metaphysics. This is how it comes about that unity seems to be the root of what it is to be good, and plurality the root of what it is to be evil; that is why Pythagoras in his correlations placed unity on the side of goodness and plurality on the side of evil, as is clear in the first book of the Metaphysics.
(3) Hinc videri potest quod peccare nichil est aliud quam progredi ab uno spreto ad multa; quod quidem Psalmista videbat dicens: «A fructu frumenti, vini et olei multiplicati sunt». (3) Hence it can be seen that to sin is nothing other than to spurn unity and move towards plurality; the Psalmist saw this when he said: "From the fruit of the corn, the wine and the oil they have been multiplied".
(4) Constat igitur quod omne quod est bonum per hoc est bonum: quod in uno consistit. Et cum concordia, in quantum huiusmodi, sit quoddam bonum, manifestum est ipsam consistere in aliquo uno tanquam in propria radice. (4) It is clear then that everything which is good is good for this reason: that it constitutes a unity. And since concord, in itself, is a good, it is clear that it consists in some unity as in its root.
(5) Que quidem radix apparebit, si natura vel ratio concordie summatur: est enim concordia uniformis motus plurium voluntatum; in qua quidem ratione apparet unitatem voluntatum, que per uniformem motum datur intelligi, concordie radicem esse vel ipsam concordiam. (5) What this root is will appear if we consider the nature or meaning of concord, for concord is a uniform movement of several wills; from this definition it is clear that unity of wills, which is what is signified by "uniform movement", is the root of concord or indeed is concord itself.
(6) Nam, sicut plures glebas diceremus 'concordes' propter condescendere omnes ad medium, et plures flammas propter coadscendere omnes ad circunferentiam, si voluntarie hoc facerent; ita homines plures 'concordes' dicimus propter simul moveri secundum velle ad unum quod est formaliter in suis voluntatibus, sicut qualitas una formaliter in glebis, scilicet gravitas, et una in flammis, scilicet levitas. (6) For just as we would describe a number of clods of earth as being "in concord" because of their all falling towards the centre of the world, and a number of flames as in concord because of their all rising towards its circumference, if they did this of their own free will; in the same way we describe a number of people as being in concord when they move all together and of their own free will towards one thing which is in their wills formally, just as there is one quality (heaviness) formally in the clods of earth, and another (lightness) in the flames.
(7) Nam virtus volitiva potentia quedam est, sed speties boni apprehensi forma est eius: que quidem forma, quemadmodum et alie, una in se, multiplicatur secundum multiplicationem materie recipientis, ut anima et numerus et alie forme compositioni contingentes. (7) For the capacity to will is a potentiality, and its form is the image of good which is perceived; and this form, just like other forms, is one in itself and becomes multiple according to the multiplicity of the material which receives it - just like soul, number and other forms which are found in composites.
(8) Hiis premissis propter declarationem assumende propositionis ad propositum, sic arguatur: omnis concordia dependet ab unitate, que est in voluntatibus; genus humanum optime se habens est quedam concordia; nam, sicut unus homo optime se habens et quantum ad animam et quantum ad corpus est concordia quedam, et similiter domus, civitas et regnum, sic totum genus humanum; ergo genus humanum optime se habens ab unitate que est in voluntatibus dependet. (8) Having made these preliminary points in order to clarify the proposition to be advanced for our purposes, we may reason as follows: all concord depends on the unity which is in wills; mankind in its ideal state represents a kind of concord; for just as one man in his ideal state spiritually and physically is a kind of concord (and the same holds true of a household, a city, and a kingdom), so is the whole of mankind; thus the whole of mankind in its ideal state depends on the unity which is in men's wills.
(9) Sed hoc esse non potest nisi sit voluntas una, domina et regulatrix omnium aliarum in unum, cum mortalium voluntates propter blandas adolescentie delectationes indigeant directivo, ut in ultimis ad Nicomacum docet Phylosophus. Nec ista una potest esse, nisi sit princeps unus omnium, cuius voluntas domina et regulatrix aliarum omnium esse possit. (9) But this cannot be unless there is one will which controls and directs all the others towards one goal, since the wills of mortals require guidance on account of the seductive pleasures of youth, as Aristotle teaches at the end of the Ethics. Nor can such a single will exist, unless there is one ruler who rules over everybody, whose will can control and guide all the other wills.
(10) Quod si omnes consequentie superiores vere sunt, quod sunt, necesse est ad optime se habere humanum genus esse in mundo Monarcham, et per consequens Monarchiam ad bene esse mundi. (10) Now if all the above conclusions are true - as they are - for mankind to be in its ideal state there must be a monarch in the world, and consequently the well-being of the world requires a monarchy.