Monarchia (I, xiii, 1-8)

(1) Adhuc, ille qui potest esse optime dispositus ad regendum, optime alios disponere potest: nam in omni actione principaliter intenditur ab agente, sive necessitate nature sive voluntarie agat, propriam similitudinem explicare. (1) Besides, the person who is himself capable of being best disposed to rule is capable of disposing others best, for in every action the primary aim of the agent, whether it act because its nature compels it to or as a matter of free choice, is to reproduce its own likeness.
(2) Unde fit quod omne agens, in quantum huiusmodi, delectatur; quia, cum omne quod est appetat suum esse, ac in agendo agentis esse quodammodo amplietur, sequitur de necessitate delectatio, quia delectatio rei desiderate semper annexa est. (2) Hence every agent, precisely as agent, takes pleasure in its own action; for since everything which exists desires its own being, and in acting the agent's being is in some sense enhanced, of necessity pleasure ensues, since pleasure is always connected to something which is desired.
(3) Nichil igitur agit nisi tale existens quale patiens fieri debet; propter quod Phylosophus in hiis que De simpliciter ente: «Omne» inquit «quod reducitur de potentia in actum, reducitur per tale existens actu»; quod si aliter aliquid agere conetur, frustra conatur. (3) Therefore nothing acts unless it has the qualities which are to be communicated to the thing acted upon; hence Aristotle in the Metaphysics says: "The movement from potentiality to actuality comes about by means of something which is already actual"; any attempt to do otherwise would be a vain attempt.
(4) Et hinc destrui potest error illorum qui bona loquendo et mala operando credunt alios vita et moribus informare, non advertentes quod plus persuaserunt manus Iacob quam verba, licet ille falsum, illa verum persuaderent. Unde Phylosophus ad Nicomacum «De hiis enim» inquit «que in passionibus et actionibus, sermones minus sunt credibiles operibus». (4) And thus we can refute the error of those who, expressing worthy sentiments and doing wrong, nonetheless believe they can influence the lives and behaviour of others, not realising that Jacob's hands carried more weight than his words, even though his hands deceived and his words revealed the truth. Hence Aristotle in the Ethics says: "In matters where passions and actions are involved, words carry less conviction than actions".
(5) Hinc etiam dicebatur de celo peccatori David: «Quare tu enarras iustitias meas?», quasi diceret: 'Frustra loqueris, cum tu sis alius ab eo quod loqueris'. Ex quibus colligitur quod optime dispositum esse oportet optime alios disponere volentem. (5) Hence a voice from heaven asked the sinner David: "Why do you tell of my righteousness?", as if to say: "You speak in vain, since your words are belied by what you are". From which it can be deduced that a person who wishes to dispose others for the best must himself be disposed for the best.
(6) Sed Monarcha solus est ille qui potest optime esse dispositus ad regendum. Quod sic declaratur: unaqueque res eo facilius et perfectius ad habitum et ad operationem disponitur, quo minus in ea est de contrarietate ad talem dispositionem; unde facilius et perfectius veniunt ad habitum phylosophice veritatis qui nichil unquam audiverunt, quam qui audiverunt per tempora et falsis oppinionibus imbuti sunt. Propter quod bene Galienus inquit «tales duplici tempore indigere ad scientiam acquirendam». (6) But only the monarch can be best disposed for ruling. This can be explained as follows: any thing is the more easily and perfectly disposed to acquire a particular disposition and to act in accordance with it, the less there is in it which is opposed to that disposition; thus those who have never studied philosophy acquire the habit of philosophical truth more easily and perfectly than those who have studied for a long time and become familiar with false notions. So that Galen rightly comments that such people take twice as long to acquire knowledge.
(7) Cum ergo Monarcha nullam cupiditatis occasionem habere possit vel saltem minimam inter mortales, ut superius est ostensum, quod ceteris principibus non contingit, et cupiditas ipsa sola sit corruptiva iudicii et iustitie prepeditiva, consequens est quod ipse vel omnino vel maxime bene dispositus ad regendum esse potest, quia inter ceteros iudicium et iustitiam potissime habere potest: que duo principalissime legis latori et legis executori conveniunt, testante rege illo sanctissimo cum convenientia regi et filio regis postulabat a Deo: «Deus» inquiebat «iudicium tuum regi da et iustitiam tuam filio regis». (7) Therefore since the monarch can have no occasion for greed (or in any event of all men the very least occasion), as we saw earlier, (and this is not the case with other rulers), and since it is greed alone which perverts judgment and obstructs justice, it follows that he alone, or he more than anyone else, can be well disposed to rule, since of all men he can have judgment and justice in the highest degree. These are the two chief qualities needed by the legislator and the executor of the law, as that holy king bore witness when he asked God for those things needed by the king and the king's son: "God", he said, "give your judgment to the king and your justice to the king's son".
(8) Bene igitur dictum est cum dicitur in subassumpta quod Monarcha solus est ille, qui potest esse optime dispositus ad regendum: ergo Monarcha solus optime alios disponere potest. Ex quo sequitur quod ad optimam mundi dispositionem Monarchia sit necessaria (8) What was affirmed in the minor premiss is therefore quite correct, i.e. that the monarch alone is the person who can be best disposed to rule: therefore the monarch alone can best dispose other people. It follows from this that monarchy is necessary to the well-being of the world.