Monarchia (I, xii, 1-13)

(1) Et humanum genus potissime liberum optime se habet. Hoc erit manifestum, si principium pateat libertatis. (1) Now the human race is in its ideal state when it is completely free. This will be clear if we clarify the principle of freedom.
(2) Propter quod sciendum quod principium primum nostre libertatis est libertas arbitrii, quam multi habent in ore, in intellectu vero pauci. Veniunt nanque usque ad hoc: ut dicant liberum arbitrium esse liberum de voluntate iudicium. Et verum dicunt; sed importatum per verba longe est ab eis, quemadmodum tota die logici nostri faciunt de quibusdam propositionibus, que ad exemplum logicalibus interseruntur; puta de hac: 'triangulus habet tres duobus rectis equales.' (2) Therefore it must be borne in mind that the first principle of our freedom is free will, which many people talk about but few understand. For they go so far as to say that free will is free judgment in matters of volition. And what they say is true, but they are very far from understanding what the words mean, just like our logicians who daily enunciate certain propositions by way of example in their discussions on logic, such as "a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles".
(3) Et ideo dico quod iudicium medium est apprehensionis et appetitus: nam primo res apprehenditur, deinde apprehensa bona vel mala iudicatur, et ultimo iudicans prosequitur sive fugit. (3) And therefore I say that judgment is the link between perception and appetition: for first a thing is perceived, then it is judged to be good or evil, and finally the person who judges pursues it or shuns it.
(4) Si ergo iudicium moveat omnino appetitum et nullu modo preveniatur ab eo, liberum est; si vero ab appetitu quocunque modo preveniente iudicium moveatur, liberum esse non potest, quia non a se, sed ab alio captivum trahitur. (4) Now if judgment controls desire completely and is in no way pre-empted by it, it is free; but if judgment is in any way at all pre-empted and thus controlled by desire, it cannot be free, because it does not act under its own power, but is dragged along in the power of something else.
(5) Et hinc est quod bruta iudicium liberum habere non possunt, quia eorum iudicia semper ab appetitu preveniuntur. Et hinc etiam patere potest quod substantie intellectuales, quarum sunt inmutabiles voluntates, necnon anime separate bene hinc abeuntes, libertatem arbitrii ob inmutabilitatem voluntatis non amictunt, sed perfectissime atque potissime hoc retinent. (5) And that is why the lower animals cannot have free will, because their judgments are always pre-empted by desire. And from this it is also clear that non-material beings, whose wills are unchangeable, as well as human souls who leave this world of ours in a state of grace, do not lose free will on account of the fact that their wills are unchangeable; in fact they retain it in its most perfect and true form.
(6) Hoc viso, iterum manifestum esse potest quod hec libertas sive principium hoc totius nostre libertatis est maximum donum humane nature a Deo collatum -- sicut in Paradiso Comedie iam dixi -- quia per ipsum hic felicitamur ut homines, per ipsum alibi felicitamur ut dii. (6) When this has been grasped, it can also be seen that this freedom (or this principle of all our freedom) is the greatest gift given by God to human nature - as I have already said in the Paradiso of the Comedy - since by virtue of it we become happy here as men, by virtue of it we become happy elsewhere as gods.
(7) Quod si ita est, quis erit qui humanum genus optime se habere non dicat, cum potissime hoc principio possit uti? (7) If this is the case, who will not agree that the human race is at its best when it is able to make fullest use of this principle?
(8) Sed existens sub Monarcha est potissime liberum. Propter quod sciendum quod illud est liberum quod «sui met et non alterius gratia est», ut Phylosopho placet in hiis que De simpliciter ente. Nam illud quod est alterius gratia necessitatur ab illo cuius gratia est, sicut via necessitatur a termino. (8) But living under a monarch it is supremely free. Thus it must be borne in mind that a thing is free which exists "for its own sake and not for the sake of something else", as Aristotle states in the Metaphysics. For a thing which exists for the sake of something else is necessarily conditioned by that other for whose sake it exists, as a route is necessarily conditioned by its terminus.
(9) Genus humanum solum imperante Monarcha sui et non alterius gratia est: tunc enim solum politie diriguntur oblique -- democratie scilicet, oligarchie atque tyrampnides -- que in servitutem cogunt genus humanum, ut patet discurrenti per omnes, et politizant reges, aristocratici quos optimates vocant, et populi libertatis zelatores; quia cum Monarcha maxime diligat homines, ut iam tactum est, vult omnes homines bonos fieri: quod esse non potest apud oblique politizantes. (9) Mankind exists for its own sake and not for the sake of something else only when it is under the rule of a monarch, for only then are perverted forms of government (i.e. democracies, oligarchies and tyrannies), which force mankind into slavery, set right - as is clear to anyone who examines them all; and only then do kings, aristocrats (known as the great and the good), and those zealous for the freedom of the people govern justly; for since the monarch loves men most, as we have already noted, he wants all men to become good; and this cannot happen under perverted forms of government.
(10) Unde Phylosophus in suis Politicis ait quod in politia obliqua bonus homo est malus civis, in recta vero bonus homo et civis bonus convertuntur. Rt huiusmodi politie recte libertatem intendunt, scilicet ut homines propter se sint. (10) Hence Aristotle in the Politics says that in bad government the good man is a bad citizen, whereas in good government the good man and the good citizen are one and the same thing. And these just forms of government aim at freedom, i.e. that men should exist for their own sake.
(11) Non enim cives propter consules nec gens propter regem, sed e converso consules propter cives et rex propter gentem; quia quemadmodum non politia ad leges, quinymo leges ad politiam ponuntur, sic secundum legem viventes non ad legislatorem ordinantur, sed magis ille ad hos, ut etiam Phylosopho placet in hiis que de presenti materia nobis ab eo relicta sunt. (11) For citizens do not exist for the sake of consuls, nor the people for the sake of the king, but on the contrary consuls exist for the sake of the citizens and the king for the people; for just as a political community is not formed for the sake of the laws, but the laws are framed for the benefit of the political community, in the same way those whose lives are governed by the law are not there for the sake of the legislator, but rather he is there for their sake, as Aristotle says in those writings he left to us on this subject.
(12) Hinc etiam patet quod quamvis consul sive rex respectu vie sint domini aliorum, respectu autem termini aliorum ministri sunt, et maxime Monarcha, qui minister omnium proculdubio habendus est. Hinc etiam iam innotescere potest quod Monarcha necessitatur a fine sibi prefixo in legibus ponendis. (12) Thus it is apparent that, although a consul or a king are masters over others with respect to means, with respect to ends they are the servants of others; and this is especially true of the monarch, who is to be considered without doubt the servant of all men. Thus it is already clear that the very same goal which requires the formulation of laws requires also that there be a monarch.
(13) Ergo genus humanum sub Monarcha existens optime se habet; ex quo sequitur quod ad bene esse mundi Monarchiam necesse est esse. (13) Therefore mankind living under a monarch is in its ideal state; from this it follows that monarchy is necessary for the well-being of the world.