Monarchia (I, xi, 1-20)

(1) Preterea, mundus optime dispositus est cum iustitia in eo potissima est. Unde Virgilius commendare volens illud seculum quod suo tempore surgere videbatur, in suis Buccolicis cantabat:
Iam redit et Virgo, redeunt Saturnia regna.
'Virgo' nanque vocabatur iustitia, quam etiam 'Astream' vocabant; 'Saturnia regna' dicebant optima tempora, que etiam 'aurea' nuncupabant. 		(1) Furthermore, the world is ordered in the best possible way when justice is at its strongest in it. Thus Virgil, wishing to praise the age which seemed to be emerging in his day, sang in his Eclogues: "Now the Virgin returns, the reign of Saturn returns". For "the virgin" was their name for justice, whom they also called "Astrea"; the "reign of Saturn" was their name for the best of times, which they also called "golden".
(2) Iustitia potissima est solum sub Monarcha: ergo ad optimam mundi dispositionem requiritur esse Monarchiam sive Imperium. (2) Justice is at its strongest only under a monarch; therefore for the best ordering of the world there must be a monarchy or empire.
(3) Ad evidentiam subassumpte sciendum quod iustitia, de se et in propria natura considerata, est quedam rectitudo sive regula obliquum hinc inde abiciens: et sic non recipit magis et minus, quemadmodum albedo in suo abstracto considerata. (3) To clarify the minor premiss, it must be understood that justice, considered in itself and in its own nature, is a kind of rectitude or rule which spurns deviation from the straight path to either side; and thus it does not admit of a more and a less - just like whiteness considered in the abstract.
(4) Sunt enim huiusmodi forme quedam compositioni contingentes, et consistentes simplici et invariabili essentia, ut Magister Sex Principiorum recte ait. Recipiunt tamen magis et minus huiusmodi qualitates ex parte subiectorum quibus concernuntur, secundum quod magis et minus in subiectis de contrariis admiscetur. (4) There are forms of this kind, in fact, which are to be found in composites, but which in themselves consist of a simple and unchangeable essence, as the Master of the Six Principles rightly says. Such qualities are present to a greater or lesser degree depending on the subjects in which they are given concrete form, according as these subjects contain more or less of their opposites.
(5) Ubi ergo minimum de contrario iustitie admiscetur et quantum ad habitum et quantum ad operationem, ibi iustitia potissima est; et vere tunc potest dici de illa, ut Phylosophus inquit, «neque Hesperus neque Lucifer sic admirabilis est». Est enim tunc Phebe similis, fratrem dyametraliter intuenti de purpureo matutine serenitatis. (5) Therefore justice is at its strongest where there is least of what is opposed to justice both in the disposition and in the actions of an agent; and then truly it can be said of her, as Aristotle says, "neither Hesperus nor Lucifer is so wondrous". For she is then like Phoebe gazing across the heavens at her brother from the rosy flush of the clear morning sky, from a point on the horizon diametrically opposite.
(6) Quantum ergo ad habitum, iustitia contrarietatem habet quandoque in velle; nam ubi voluntas ab omni cupiditate sincera non est, etsi assit iustitia, non tamen omnino inest in fulgore sue puritatis: habet enim subiectum, licet minime, aliqualiter tamen sibi resistens; propter quod bene repelluntur qui iudicem passionare conantur. (6) As far as disposition is concerned, justice is sometimes impeded in the will; for where the will is not entirely free of all greed, even if justice is present, nonetheless it is not entirely present in the splendour of its purity; for the subject has something, however slight, which is in some way resistant to it; and this is why those who try to stir up a judge's emotions are rightly rebuffed.
(7) Quantum vero ad operationem, iustitia contrarietatem habet in posse; nam cum iustitia sit virtus ad alterum, sine potentia tribuendi cuique quod suum est quomodo quis operabitur secundum illam? Ex quo patet quod quanto iustus potentior, tanto in operatione sua iustitia erit amplior. (7) As far as actions are concerned, justice is sometimes impeded with regard to power; for since justice is a virtue that operates in relation to other people, if someone does not have the power to give to each person what is his, how will he act in accordance with justice? From this it is clear that the more powerful a just man is, the more effectively will justice be brought about by his actions.
(8) Ex hac itaque declaratione sic arguatur: iustitia potissima est in mundo quando volentissimo et potentissimo subiecto inest; huiusmodi solus Monarcha est: ergo soli Monarche insistens iustitia in mundo potissima est. (8) Building on this exposition we can argue as follows: justice is at its strongest in the world when it resides in a subject who has in the highest degree possible the will and the power to act; only the monarch is such a subject; therefore justice is at its strongest in the world when it is located in the monarch alone.
(9) Iste prosillogismus currit per secundam figuram cum negatione intrinseca, et est similis huic: omne B est A; solum C est A: ergo solum C est B. Quod est: omne B est A; nullum preter C est A: ergo nullum preter C est B. (9) This prosyllogism is of the second figure with intrinsic negation, and it takes this form: all B is A; only C is A; therefore only C is B. That is: all B is A; nothing except C is A; therefore nothing except C is B.
(10) Et prima propositio declaratione precedente apparet; alia sic ostenditur, et primo quantum ad velle, deinde quantum ad posse. (10) And the first proposition is established by the preceding exposition; the second is shown as follows, firstly in relation to volition, and then in relation to power.
(11) Ad evidentiam primi notandum quod iustitie maxime contrariatur cupiditas, ut innuit Aristoteles in quinto ad Nicomacum. Remota cupiditate omnino, nichil iustitie restat adversum; unde sententia Phylosophi est ut que lege determinari possunt nullo modo iudici relinquantur. Et hoc metu cupiditatis fieri oportet, de facili mentes hominum detorquentis. Ubi ergo non est quod possit optari, inpossibile est ibi cupiditatem esse: destructis enim obiectis, passiones esse non possunt. (11) To clarify the first of these it must be noted that the thing most contrary to justice is greed, as Aristotle states in the fifth book of the Ethics. When greed is entirely eliminated, nothing remains which is opposed to justice; hence Aristotle's opinion that those things which can be resolved by law should in no way be left to the judge's discretion. And it is fear of greed which makes this necessary, for greed easily leads men's minds astray. But where there is nothing which can be coveted, it is impossible for greed to exist, for emotions cannot exist where their objects have been destroyed.
(12) Sed Monarcha non habet quod possit optare: sua nanque iurisdictio terminatur Occeano solum: quod non contingit principibus aliis, quorum principatus ad alios terminantur, ut puta regis Castelle ad illum qui regis Aragonum. Ex quo sequitur quod Monarcha sincerissimum inter mortales iustitie possit esse subiectum. (12) But there is nothing the monarch could covet, for his jurisdiction is bounded only by the ocean; whereas this is not the case with other rulers, whose sovereignty extends only as far as the neighbouring kingdom, as is the case, for instance, with the kings of Castille and of Aragon. From this it follows that of all men the monarch can be the purest embodiment of justice.
(13) Preterea, quemadmodum cupiditas habitualem iustitiam quodammodo, quantumcumque pauca, obnubilat, sic karitas seu recta dilectio illam acuit atque dilucidat. Cui ergo maxime recta dilectio inesse potest, potissimum locum in illo potest habere iustitia; huiusmodi est Monarcha: ergo, eo existente, iustitia potissima est vel esse potest. (13) Moreover, just as greed, however slight, dulls the habit of justice in some way, so charity or rightly ordered love makes it sharper and brighter. So the man in whom rightly ordered love can be strongest is the one in whom justice can have its principal abode; the monarch is such a man; therefore justice is or can be at its strongest when he exists.
(14) Quod autem recta dilectio faciat quod dictum est, hinc haberi potest. cupiditas nanque, perseitate hominum spreta, querit alia; karitas vero, spretis aliis omnibus, querit Deum et hominem, et per consequens bonum hominis. Cumque inter alia bona hominis potissimum sit in pace vivere -- ut supra dicebatur -- et hoc operetur maxime atque potissime iustitia, karitas maxime iustitiam vigorabit et potior potius. (14) That rightly ordered love does what has been stated can be deduced from this: greed, scorning the intrinsic nature of man, seeks other things; whereas love, scorning all other things, seeks God and man, and hence the true good of man. Since among the other goods available to man living in peace is supremely important (as we saw earlier), and justice principally and most effectively brings this about, love most of all will strengthen justice, and the stronger love is the more it will do so.
(15) Et quod Monarche maxime hominum recta dilectio inesse debeat, patet sic: omne diligibile tanto magis diligitur quanto propinquius est diligenti; sed homines propinquius Monarche sunt quam aliis principibus: ergo ab eo maxime diliguntur vel diligi debent. Prima manifesta est, si natura passivorum et activorum consideretur; secunda per hoc apparet: quia principibus aliis homines non appropinquant nisi in parte, Monarche vero secundum totum. (15) And that the monarch more than all other men should feel rightly ordered love can be shown as follows: the closer any loved object is to the lover the more it is loved; but men are closer to the monarch than to other princes; therefore they are more loved by him, or ought to be. The first premiss is clear if we take into consideration the nature of agents and patients; the second becomes clear if we bear in mind this fact, that men are close to other rulers only as parts, but they are close to the monarch as a totality.
(16) Et rursus: principibus aliis appropinquant per Monarcham et non e converso; et sic per prius et inmediate Monarche inest cura de omnibus, aliis autem principibus per Monarcham, eo quod cura ipsorum a cura illa supprema descendit. (16) Again, they are close to other rulers by virtue of the monarch, and not vice versa; and thus concern for all men's welfare is primarily and directly the monarch's concern; other rulers share in it through the monarch, since their concern derives from that higher concern of his.
(17) Preterea, quanto causa est universalior, tanto magis habet rationem cause, quia inferior non est causa nisi per superiorem, ut patet ex hiis que De causis; et quanto causa magis est causa, tanto magis effectum diligit, cum dilectio talis assequatur causam per se. (17) Besides, the more universal a cause is, the more truly it is a cause, because the lower is not a cause except by virtue of the higher, as is clear from the De causis; and the more truly a cause is a cause, the more it loves its own effect, since this love follows from the cause as such.
(18) Cum igitur Monarcha sit universalissima causa inter mortales, ut homines bene vivant, quia principes alii per illum, ut dictum est; consequens est quod bonum hominum ab eo maxime diligatur. (18) Therefore, since the monarch is the most universal cause among mortals that men should live the good life (for other rulers are a cause only by virtue of him, as we have seen), it follows that the good of mankind is dear to him above all else.
(19) Quod autem Monarcha potissime se habeat ad operationem iustitie, quis dubitat nisi qui vocem hanc non intelligit, cum, si Monarcha est, hostes habere non possit? (19) Who doubts that the monarch is most strongly disposed to the working of justice, except those who do not understand the meaning of the word, since, if he is monarch, he cannot have enemies?
(20) Satis igitur declarata subassumpta principalis, quia conclusio certa est: scilicet quod ad optimam dispositionem mundi necesse est Monarchiam esse. (20) The minor premiss of the main syllogism has been sufficiently proved and the conclusion is certain, namely that the best ordering of the world requires the existence of a monarchy.