Monarchia (I, x, 1-6)

(1) Et ubicunque potest esse litigium, ibi debet esse iudicium; aliter esset inperfectum sine proprio perfectivo: quod est inpossibile, cum Deus et natura in necessariis non deficiat. (1) Now wherever there can be conflict there must be judgment to resolve it, otherwise there would be an imperfection without its proper corrective; and this is impossible, since God and nature never fail in their provision of what is necessary.
(2) Inter omnes duos principes, quorum alter alteri minime subiectus est, potest esse litigium vel culpa ipsorum vel etiam subditorum -- quod de se patet --: ergo inter tales oportet esse iudicium. (2) There is always the possibility of conflict between two rulers where one is not subject to the other's control; such conflict may come about either through their own fault or the fault of their subjects (the point is self-evident); therefore there must be judgment between them.
(3) Et cum alter de altero cognoscere non possit ex quo alter alteri non subditur -- nam par in parem non habet imperium -- oportet esse tertium iurisdictionis amplioris qui ambitu sui iuris ambobus principetur. (3) And since neither can judge the other (since neither is under the other's control, and an equal has no power over an equal) there must be a third party of wider jurisdiction who rules over both of them by right.
(4) Et hic aut erit Monarcha aut non. Si sic, habetur propositum; si non, iterum habebit sibi coequalem extra ambitum sue iurisdictionis: tunc iterum necessarius erit tertius alius. (4) And this person will either be the monarch or not. If he is, then our point is proved; if he is not, he in his turn will have an equal who is outside the sphere of his jurisdiction, and then it will once again be necessary to have recourse to a third party.
(5) Et sic aut erit processus in infinitum, quod esse non potest, aut oportebit devenire ad iudicem primum et summum, de cuius iudicio cuncta litigia dirimantur sive mediate sive inmediate: et hic erit Monarcha sive Imperator. Est igitur Monarchia necessaria mundo. (5) And so either this procedure will continue ad infinitum, which is not possible, or else we must come to a first and supreme judge, whose judgment resolves all disputes either directly or indirectly; and this man will be the monarch or emperor. Thus monarchy is necessary to the world.
(6) Et hanc rationem videbat Phylosophus cum dicebat: «Entia nolunt male disponi; malum autem pluralitas principatuum: unus ergo princeps». (6) And Aristotle saw the force of this argument when he said: "Things do not wish to be badly ordered; a plurality of reigns is bad; therefore let there be one ruler".