Monarchia (I, ii, 1-8)

(1) Primum quidem igitur videndum quid est quod 'temporalis Monarchia' dicitur, typo ut dicam et secundum intentionem. (1) Firstly therefore we must see what is meant by "temporal monarchy", in broad terms and as it is generally understood.
(2) Est ergo temporalis Monarchia, quam dicunt 'Imperium', unicus principatus et super omnes in tempore vel in hiis et super hiis que tempore mensurantur. (2) Temporal monarchy, then, which men call "empire", is a single sovereign authority set over all others in time, that is to say over all authorities which operate in those things and over those things which are measured by time.
(3) Maxime autem de hac tria dubitata queruntur: primo nanque dubitatur et queritur an ad bene esse mundi necessaria sit; secundo an romanus populus de iure Monarche offitium sibi asciverit; et tertio an auctoritas Monarche dependeat a Deo inmediate vel ab alio, Dei ministro seu vicario. (3) Now there are three main points of inquiry which have given rise to perplexity on this subject: first, is it is necessary to the well-being of the world? second, did the Roman people take on the office of the monarch by right? and third, does the monarch's authority derive directly from God or from someone else (his minister or vicar)?
(4) Verum, quia omnis veritas que non est principium ex veritate alicuius principii fit manifesta, necesse est in qualibet inquisitione habere notitiam de principio, in quod analetice recurratur pro certitudine omnium propositionum que inferius assummuntur. Et quia presens tractatus est inquisitio quedam, ante omnia de principio scruptandum esse videtur in cuius virtute inferiora consistant. (4) Now since every truth which is not itself a first principle must be demonstrated with reference to the truth of some first principle, it is necessary in any inquiry to know the first principle to which we refer back in the course of strict deductive argument in order to ascertain the truth of all the propositions which are advanced later. And since this present treatise is a kind of inquiry, we must at the outset investigate the principle whose truth provides a firm foundation for later propositions.
(5) Est ergo sciendum quod quedam sunt que, nostre potestati minime subiacentia, speculari tantummodo possumus, operari autem non; velut mathematica, physica et divina; quedam vero sunt que, nostre potestati subiacentia, non solum speculari sed etiam operari possumus: et in hiis non operatio propter speculationem, sed hec propter illam assummitur, quoniam in talibus operatio finis. (5) For it must be noted that there are certain things (such as mathematics, the sciences and divinity) which are outside human control, and about which we can only theorise, but which we cannot affect by our actions; and then there are certain things which are within our control, where we can not only theorise but also act, and in these action is not for the sake of theory, but theorising is for the sake of taking action, since in these the objective is to take action.
(6) Cum ergo materia presens politica sit, ymo fons atque principium rectarum politiarum, et omne politicum nostre potestati subiaceat, manifestum est quod materia presens non ad speculationem per prius, sed ad operationem ordinatur. (6) Now since our present subject is political, indeed is the source and starting-point of just forms of government, and everything in the political sphere comes under human control, it is clear that the present subject is not directed primarily towards theoretical understanding but towards action.
(7) Rursus, cum in operabilibus principium et causa omnium sit ultimus finis -- movet enim primo agentem --, consequens est ut omnis ratio eorum que sunt ad finem ab ipso fine summatur. Nam alia erit ratio incidendi lignum propter domum constituendam, et alia propter navim. (7) Again, since in actions it is the final objective which sets in motion and causes everything - for that is what first moves a person who acts - it follows that the whole basis of the means for attaining an end is derived from the end itself. For there will be one way of cutting wood to build a house, and another to build a ship.
(8) Illud igitur, siquid est, quod sit finis universalis civilitatis humani generis, erit hic principium per quo omnia que inferius probanda sunt erunt manifesta sufficienter: esse autem finem huius civilitatis et illius, et non esse unum omnium finem arbitrari stultum est. (8) Therefore whatever constitutes the purpose of the whole of human society (if there is such a purpose) will be here the first principle, in terms of which all subsequent propositions to be proved will be demonstrated with sufficient rigour; for it would be foolish to suppose that there is one purpose for this society and another for that, and not a common purpose for all of them.