Questio de aqua et terra (40-49)

(40) Nam cum adequatio corporis gravis non fiat per quantitatem, in quantum quantitas, sed per pondus, poterit ibi esse adequatio ponderis, cum non sit ibi adequatio quantitatis; et sic illa demonstratio est; apparens et non existens. (40) For, since the equalising of a heavy body is not effected by its quantity, as quantity, but by its weight, there might be an equalising of weight where there was no equalising of quantity; and so the demonstration is apparent and not real.
(41) [XVIII]. Sed talis instantia nulla est; procedit enim ex ignorantia nature homogeneorum et simplicium. Corpora enim homogenea et simplicia -- sunt homogenea ut aurum depuratum, et simplicia ut ignis et terra -- regulariter in suis partibus qualificantur omni naturali passione. (41) But this rejoinder is futile, since it proceeds from ignorance of the nature of homogeneous and rejected elementary bodies; for elementary bodies, too, are homogeneous. Homogeneous ones, such as refined gold, and elementary bodies, such as fire and earth, are uniformly qualified in all their parts, by any affection natural to them.
(42) Unde, cum terra sit corpus simplex, regulariter in suis partibus qualificatur, naturaliter et per se loquendo; quare cum gravitas insit naturaliter terre, et terra sit corpus simplex, necesse est ipsam in omnibus partibus suis regularem habere gravitatem, secundum proportionem quantitatis; et sic cadit ratio instantie principalis. (42) Wherefore, since earth is an elementary body, it is uniformly qualified in its parts by nature and, so to speak, of itself. Wherefore, since gravity is naturally inherent in earth, and earth is an elementary body, it must of necessity possess gravity uniformly, in all its parts, in proportion to its quantity; and thus the validity of the initial rejoinder fails.
(43) Unde respondendum est quod ratio instantie sophistica est, quia fallit secundum quid et simpliciter. (43) Whence we must answer that the nature of the rejoinder is sophistical, for it fails to distinguish rightly between 'relative' and 'absolute.'
(44) Propter quod sciendum est quod Natura universalis non frustratur suo fine; unde, licet natura particularis aliquando propter inobedientiam materie ab intento fine frustretur, Natura tamen universalis nullo modo potest a sua intentione deficere, cum Nature universali equaliter actus et potentia rerum, que possunt esse et non esse, subiaceant. (44) And therefore be it known that universal nature is not baulked of her goal. And so, though particular nature may be baulked of her intended goal by the recalcitrance of matter, yet universal nature can in no sort fail of her intention, since both the actuality and the potentiality of things which may be or not be, are equally subject to universal nature.
(45) Sed intentio Nature universalis est ut omnes forme, que sunt in potentia materie prime, reducantur in actum, et secundum rationem speciei sint in actu; ut materia prima secundum suam totalitatem sit sub omni forma materiali, licet secundum partem sit sub omni privatione opposita, preter unam. (45) But it is the intention of universal nature that all the forms which are within the potentiality of first matter should be reduced to actuality, and should be actualised in specific fashion, in order that first matter, in its totality, should be submitted to every material form, although in each of its parts it should be submitted to every opposite privation save one.
(46) Nam cum omnes forme, que sunt in potentia materie, ydealiter sint in actu in Motore celi, ut dicit Comentator in De Substantia Orbis, si omnes iste forme non essent semper in actu, Motor celi deficeret ab integritate diffusionis sue bonitatis, quod non est dicendum. (46) For since all forms which are ideally within the potentiality of matter, are actualised in the mover of heaven, as the Commentator says in the De Substantia Orbis, if all these forms were not continuously actualised, the mover of heaven would fail of the complete diffusion of his excellence, which may not be uttered.
(47) Et cum omnes forme materiales generabilium et corruptibilium, preter formas elementorum, requirant materiam et subiectum mixtum et complexionatum, ad quod tanquam ad finem ordinata sunt elementa in quantum elementa, et mixtio esse non possit ubi miscibilia simul esse non possunt, ut de se patet; necesse est e se partem in universo ubi omnia miscibilia, scilicet elementa, convenire possint; hec autem esse non posset, nisi terra in aliqua parte emergeretur, ut patet intuenti. (47) And since all material forms of things that can come into and pass out of existence, except the forms of the elements, require a mingled and compound material and substrate, whereto, as to their end, the elements, as elements, are ordained, and there can be no mixture except where the things to be mixed can come together, as is obvious, it is necessary that there should be some place in the universe where all the things capable of being mixed, to wit, elements may have leave to come together. But this might not be unless earth at some point emerged, as is plain on reflection.
(48) Unde cum intentioni Nature universalis omnis natura obediat, necesse fuit etiam preter simplicem naturam terre, que est esse deorsum, inesse aliam naturam per quam obediret intentioni universalis Nature; ut scilicet pateretur elevari in parte a virtute celi, tanquam obediens a precipiente, sicut videmus de concupiscibili et irascibili in homine; que licet secundum proprium impetum ferantur secundum sensitivam affectionem, secundum tamen quod rationi obedibiles sunt, quandoque a proprio impetu retrahuntur, ut patet ex primo Ethicorum. (48) Whence, since every [special] nature obeys the intention of universal nature, it was necessary that over and above the simple nature of earth, which is to be below, it should have another nature whereby to obey the intention of universal nature; namely, that it should be susceptible of being elevated in part by the virtue of heaven, as the obeying by the commanding; just as we see in the case of the appetitive and resenting nature in man, which, although their proper impulse urges them to obey the affections of sense, yet in so far as they are susceptible of obedience to reason, are sometimes restrained from their proper impulse, as appears from the first of the Ethics.
(49) [XIX]. Et ideo, licet terra secundum simplicem eius naturam equaliter petat centrum, ut in ratione instantie dicebatur, secundum tamen naturam quandam patitur elevari in parte, Nature universali obediens, ut mixtio sit possibilis. (49) Therefore though earth according to its simple nature seeks the centre equally, as was said in discussing the rejoinder, yet according to a certain nature it is susceptible of being partially elevated, in obedience to universal nature, that the mingling may be possible.